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THE WORK OF THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT
FOR THE YEAR 1943
STATISTICAL SURVEY
T. H.

PARRISH

In 1943 the total number of opinions handed down by the Missouri
Supreme Court was 289, two of these opinions representing four separate
cases each, one opinion representing three separate cases, and nine opinions
representing two separate cases each, thus making a total of 306 cases disposed of by opinion.,
There was one change in the personnel of the court, Commissioner
Laurence M. Hyde succeeding Judge Charles T. Hays whose term expired
on December 31, 1942. Judge Hyde was appointed Jan. 1, 1943. Commissioner Paul Van Osdol succeeded Commissioner Hyde as of Jan. 4, 1943.
Honorable Cyrus Crane sat in our case as special judge by appointment
of the court.
Table I shows the number of opinions written by individual judges and
commissioners in 1943.

TABLE I
NuMBER OF OPINIONS WRITrEN

Judges
17
C lark .....................................................................................................
I
--------------------------------------------------------Crane
16
Douglas -----------------------------------------------------...
28
E llison ..................................................................................................
9
Gantt --------------------------------------------------------------- ----------- ------------ ---------- ------ 1
H ays 2 ------------------------------------------------------

1. The trend of litigation has remained relatively constant over the past

several years: 1935, 331; 1936, 369; 1937, 277; 1938, 303; 1939, 290; 1940, 282;
1941, 336; 1942, 293.
2. Judge Hays' term expired on December 31, 1942 and although this
opinion was written in 1942 it was not handed down and reported until 1943.
(297)
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H yde .. .............................................................................................
Leedy ................................................................................................
T ipton ...............................................................................................

[Vol. 9
16
28
19

Commissioners
B arrett .............................................................................................
26
B ohling ..............................................................................................
29
Bradley .............................................................................................
23
D alton .............................................................................................
23
V an Osdol ........................................................................................
20
Westhues ...........................................................................................
33
Table II shows the relative activity in the different fields of law within
the cases decided in 1943. The majority of the cases involved several issues
so it has been necessary, for the purposes of this study, to place each case
arbitrarily in one classification only.
TABLE II
ToPIcAL ANAYxsIS OF DECISIONS

Adm inistrative Law ......................................................................
2
A gency ................................................................................................
1
Appeal and Error ............................................................................
12
A ttorney and Client ..........................................................................
2
B anks and B anking .......................................................................
2
Bills and Notes .................................................................................
3
Certiorari .............................................................................................
1
Constitutional Law .........................................................................
6
Contem pt ..........................................................................................
2
Contracts .........................................................................................
8
Corporations .....................................................................................
2
Courts ................................................................................................
16
Creditors' R ights ..............................................................................
2
Crim inal Law ....................................................................................
42
D am ages ...................................................
3
Elections ............................................................................................
3
Em inent D om ain ...............................................................................
5
E quity .............................................................................................
16
Evidence .............................................................................................

10

G ifts ......................................................
1
Habeas Corpus .................................................................................
3
Insane Persons ..........................................................................
. ......... 2
Insurance ..................................................
10
Mandamus ...................................................................
3
M aster and Servant ..................... ,................................................ 5
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M ortgages .................................................
5
Municipal Corporations ---------------------------------------7
Negligence (Automobiles) --------------------........................................
22
Other Negligence --------------------------------------------17
Physicians and Surgeons ..................................................................
1
Pleading -------------------------------------------------8
Practice and Procedure ....................................................................
10
Prohibition -----------------------------------------------7
Quo Warranto ----------------------------------------------1
Real Property ...........................
.. ..............................................
17
Statutes ...................................................
7
T axation ................................................................................................
10
Torts (Other than Negligence) -----------------------------------5
Trusts ..............................................................................................
3
Unemployment Compensation ..........................................................
5
Wills and Administration --------------..........................----------------------- 15
Workmen's Compensation ................................................................
4
Table III shows the disposition of litigation. Although the trial court
was affirmed in more instances than it was reversed, it is of importance to
note that in a large percentage of the cases the appellant had reason to feel
that his appeal was successful even though the trial court was affirmed in
some manner.
TABLE III
DisrosITIoN OF LITIGATION

Judgment affirmed ..............................................................................
133
Judgment affirmed, cause remanded ................................................
6
Judgment affirmed on condition of remittitur -------------------------6
Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part ..................................
2
Judgment affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part -----1
Judgment affirmed in part, reversed and remanded with directions
in part .........................................................................................
2
Judgment remanded with directions ................................................
1
Judgment reversed ..............................................................................
10
Judgment reversed and remanded ................................................
44
Judgment reversed and remanded with directions ........................ 22
Appeal dismissed ....
.....................................................
2...................
2Cause remanded with directions -..--.............................---------------1
D ecree affirm ed .......................................
--..............-...........................
8
Decree affirmed and cause remanded with directions ------------------1
Decree modified and cause remanded ..............................................
1
Decree reversed ...............................................-.................------------1
Decree reversed with directions ----------------------------------.2
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Decree reversed and remanded ........................................................
Decree reversed and remanded with directions ............................
Decree reversed in part and remanded with directions ................
Demurrer sustained and ancillary petition for temporary injunction dism issed ..............................................................................
Order affirm ed ....................................................................................
Order affirmed, cause remanded ......................................................
Order discharging petitioner .........................
Order reversed, cause remanded with directions ........................
Order sustained, judgment reversed ..............................................
Petitioner remanded to custody ......................................................
Preliminary rule discharged .............................................................
Preliminary rule discharged and peremptory writ denied ...........
Preliminary rule made permanent ..................................................
Provisional rule made absolute ......................................................
Provisional rule discharged ............................................................
*Provisional and preliminary rule discharged ..............................
New trial affirmed ........................ :...................................................
Record and opinion quashed ..........................................................
Record and opinion quashed in part ............................................
Submission of appeal set aside and cause remanded with direc
tions ..............................................................................................
Transferred to court of appeals ...................................................
W rit denied .........................................................................................
............................................. .
Writ issued .......................................
Writ made absolute ..........................................................................
Writ made permanent in part, dismissed in part ..........................
Writ quashed ..........................
Writ quashed, petitioner remanded ................................................

(Vol. 9
1
3
1
1
3
1
3
3
1
3
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
6
3
1
11
2

1
1
4
5
1

SUMMARY

177
Cases affirm ed .....................................................................................
Cases wherein appeal was successful to some degree .................... 117
12
Cases otherwise disposed of ...........................................................
Table IV shows disposition of motions subsequent to decision. This
does not include those motions where a rehearing was granted or where the
case was transferred to the court en banc, records of such motions not being
available.
TABLE IV
MISCELLANEOUS

Rehearing denied ................................................................................
Motion to transfer to court en bane denied .................................
.................
Motion to modify denied .
Motion to modify or clarify overruled ............................................
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ROBERT

L.

HOWARD*

As is well known by all students of the subject, administrative law
frequently does not find its greatest process of development in court decisions.
During the year 1943, although more than a score of cases decided by the
Supreme Court of Missouri involved administrative agencies of the state, only
a very few merit special consideration.'
Most of the cases here noted involved aspects of the functioning of the
Unemployment Compensation Commission and several deal with the problem of the binding character of findings of fact made by that agency. While
these cases probably do not change the law as heretofore existing, they appear
to be of sufficient interest to warrant having attention called to them.
The Unemployment Compensation Law2 expressly provides that, "In
any judicial proceeding . .. the findings of the commission as to the facts,
if supported by competent evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be
conclusive. ... " It is well established that this is a valid provision respected
and applied by our courts, but the language of the supreme court in the cases
giving it application varies from the mere statement of competent evidence
as used in the statute by addition of the t~rm sufficient3 borrowed from the
rule in workmen's compensation cases,4 or substantial,5 which appear to be
used interchangeably to mean the same thing.
In connection with this matter of evidence to support findings of fact
made by the commission, it is held that it is only the ultimate facts upon
which an award can be predicated that must be supported by substantial
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law. A.B. University
of Missouri, 1917; A.M., 1918; L. L.B., 1925; S.-J.D., Harvard, 1933.
1. Since Workmen's Compensation cases are dealt with in a special article
they have been excluded here.
2. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) 9432 (i) (1939) (italics added).
3. Trianon Hotel Company v. Keitel, 350 Mo. 1041, 1050, 169 S. W. (2d)

891, 896 (1943).

4. Adams v. Continental Life Insurance Co. et al., 340 Mo. 417, 424, 101 S.
W. (2d) 75, 77 (1937); A. J. Meyer & Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 348 Mo. 147, 154, 152 S. W. (2d) 184, 186 (1941). The statement is included in the cases that "'in determining the sufficienIcy of the evidence upon
which the commission based its finding we consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the finding and disregard evidence which might support a different
finding than made."'
5. H.-D. Realty Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 350
Mo. 690, 696, 168 S. W. (2d) 78, 81 (1943); Krisman v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 351 Mo. 18, 23, 171 S. W. (2d) 575, 578 (1943).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1944
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competent evidence and not the incidental facts with respect to which the
commission may have made a finding.,
In one of the above cited cases the court held that filing and prosecuting
a suit by an employee against his employer based upon a bona fide wage
dispute, though without previous notice, was not such "misconduct connected with his work" as to justify a discharge within the provisions of the
statute. Accordingly such discharge did not disqualify him for unemploy7
ment compensation.
A further unemployment compensation case determines that growing
mushrooms and canning the product involves "agricultural labor" within the
meaning of the Unemployment Compensation Law exempting the employer
of such labor from the application of the statute.8
The final case here considered involving the Unemployment Compensation Commission asserts a basis for supreme court jurisdiction on the
ground that members of the commission as state officers are parties within
the meaning of the constitutional provision conferring supreme court jurisdiction in all appellate cases in which "any state officer is a party."' 0 The
Unemployment Compensation Law as amended expressly provides for appellate review by the supreme court." That, however, would not be controlling if the constitutional requirement were not satisfied. Likewise, the
mere fact that members of the commission are held to be state officers 12 and
are named as parties in the case would not alone be determinative. Members of the State Public Service Commission, the State Highway Commission, the Workmen's Compensation Commission and the State Social Security Commission are all held to be state officers but jurisdiction for appellate
review lies in the courts of appeal and not in the supreme court. This is held
6. Krisman v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 351 Mo. 18, 171

S. W. (2d) 575 (1943).
7. M.F.A. Milling Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 350
Mo. 1102, 1105, 169 S. W. (2d) 929, 931 (1943).
8. Murphy v. Midwest Mushroom Co., 350 Mo. 658, 168 S. W. (2d) 75
(1943). This case, first decided late in 1942, was included in the taxation article
of the corresponding issue of this review last year. The case' was brought before
the court in 1943 on a motion for rehearing.
9. Trianon Hotel Company v. Keitel, 350 Mo. 1041, 169 S. W. (2d) 891

(1943).

10. Constitution of Missouri, § 12, Art. 6.
11. Mo. Laws (1941) § 9432A(a) at 621.
12. Murphy et al. v. Hurlbut Undertaking & Embalming Co., 346 Mo. 405,
142 S. W. (2d) 449 (1940); Murphy et al. v. Doniphan Telephone Co., 347 Mo. 372,
147 S. W. (2d) 616 (1941); A. J. Meyer & Co. v. Unemployment Compensation
Commission, 348 Mo. 147, 152 S. W. (2d) 184 (1941).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol9/iss4/1
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to be due to the fact that in the case of each of these agencies the statute
of its creation constitutes it a "legal entity and quasi public corporation"
authorized to sue and be sued in its official name. 13 In the case of the UnempJoyment Compensation Commission the court finds that the only comparable statutory provision refers to a "civil action in- the name of the three
14
Comrssioners administering this law as members of the commission,"'
and holds that provision that the commission "shall have an official seal
which shall be judicially noticed"' 5 is not sufficient to put it in the same
category in this respect with the agencies referred to above. Thus, state
officers as such are necessary parties-within the meaning of the constitutional
provision defining jurisdiction of the supreme court.
In State ex rel. Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Buzard 6 the function of the State Public Service Commission in connection with a suit to
recover an alleged overcharge where it is claimed that a utility has erroneously applied the higher of two rates approved by the commission is adjudicated. The utility here in question had two rates, each approved by the
Public Service Commission, differing slightly for lighting service and a combination of lighting and power service. Suit was brought to recover the
excess above the lower rate and an action in prohibition challenges the
jurisdiction of the circuit court where there had been -no determination by
the commission as to which was the proper rate to be applied.
It is not contended that the Public Service Commission has authority
to direct a refund, but that no suit will lie in the court to collect such overcharge until after the commission has determined which of the two approved
rates is applicable. The supreme court sustained this contention, emphasizing
the exclusive nature of the commission's jurisdiction in first instance to deal
with such matters as are entrusted to it, and found that the power to "determine and classify which of two approved rates apply to a customer of
a public utility" falls within that category. The case is another illustration
of the familiar principle that litigants must first exhaust their administrative
remedies before going into court, as well as a recognition of the fact that the

13. State ex rel. Gehrs v. Public Service Commission, 338 Mo. 177, 90 S. W.
(2d) 390 (1935); State ex rel. Highway Commission v. Day et al., 327 Mo. 122,
123, 35 S. W. (2d) 37 (1931); State ex rel. Goldman v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission, 325 Mo. 153, 154, 27 S. W. (2d) 1026 (1930); White v. Social Security
Commission, 345 Mo. 1046, 137 S. W. (2d) 569 (1940).
14. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 9436 (h) (italics added).
15. Mo.REv. STAT. (1939) § 9426 (a).
16. 350 Mo. 763, 168 S. W. (2d) 1044 (1943).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1944
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technical problem involved in determining which of two available rates for
varying types of service is properly to be applied in a particular instance is
a matter properly entrusted to the peculiar abilities of the commission rather
than to the courts.

APPELLATE PRACTICE
CHARLES V. GARNETT*
THE JURIsDIcTION OF THE SUPREME COURT

The Constitutional Convention of Missouri, in submitting a new constitution for approval at an election to be held next February, made no
change in the provisions of the present constitution defining the jurisdiction
of appellate courts. Consequently, the bar and the courts are still faced
with the problem of determining the proper appellate jurisdiction in every
case to be reviewed. The importance of determining that question is again
illustrated by the number of cases which the court finds it necessary, each
year, to transfer to the courts of appeals. In the year under review, however,
only eleven such transfers were made, while jurisdiction was retained by the
supreme court in six other cases where jurisdictional questions were considered. From this it appears that the bar is giving more careful consideration to the question of jurisdiction at the time of taking appeals than has
been given to that question in previous years.
In order to vest jurisdiction in the supreme court upon the ground that
the issues involve the construction of either the federal or the state constitution, the question of constitutional law must in fact exist. In American
Petroleum Exchange vs. Public Service Corporation," the appeal of the
American Petroleum Exchange was transferred to the court of appeals because, although it was contended that an order of the Public Service Commission was violative of the constitutional guaranty against taking private
property for public use without just compensation, it affirmatively appeared
from the record that the commission was wholly without power to make
any order affecting appellants, a private corporation, and consequently the
commission did not, in fact, invade any constitutional rights of the appellant.
Constitutional questions, in order to afford the basis for appellate jurisdiction in the supreme court, must not only be raised at the earliest oppor*Attorney, Kansas City, LL.B., Kansas City School of Law, 1912.
1. 172 S. W. (2d) 952 (Mo. 1943).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol9/iss4/1
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tunity, but must also be properly kept alive and preserved for appellate
review. In State vs. Powers,2 a criminal case, involving a misdemeanor, it
was claimed that the officers seized certain personal property in an unlawful
search in contravention of certain specified constitutional provisions and
that the trial court erred in overruling a motion to suppress evidence thus
obtained. The motion for new trial, however, merely assigned as error the
overruling of the motion to suppress evidence without stating specifically
the ground upon which defendant relied. It was held that the words of the
motion merely indicated that "... the spot is marked in the record and add
nothing to the asserted general conclusion . . .

,"

and that, consequently,

the constitutional question was not properly kept alive in the motion for
new trial. Because of the failure of appellant to preserve the constitutional
question in the motion for new trial the case was transferred to the court
of appeals. Similarly, in Nemours vi. City of Clayton,3 the case was transferred to the court of appeals because the constitutional question was raised
for the first time in appellant's reply brief. It is pointed out that a statement first presented in a reply brief that the supreme court has jurisdiction
because of a constitutional issue is not in compliance with the spirit of Rule
15 of the supreme court. In that case, also, it clearly appeared that the
purported constitutional question was merely a contention that certain statutes and ordinances, if given a certain construction, would be unconstitutional. The court states: "Courts of appeals have ample authority to construe statutes and ordinances. The tendered issue, if otherwise timely and
properly presented, does not raise a constitutional issue in an appellate
jurisdictional sense."
While it would seem that the constitutional requirement that the amount
involved shall exceed $7500 in order to vest appellate jurisdiction in the
supreme court is a simple requirement, it has in practice proved to be quite
difficult. Out of eleven cases transferred to the courts of appeal in the year
under review, five of those transferred were upon the ground of absence of
an affirmative showing of the proper jurisdictional amount; and one of the
cases in which the question of jurisdictional amount was of such refinement
that it took three appellate court opinions to settle it.
The case last referred to is Odom vs. Langston, a suit attacking the
validity of a certain trust agreement. The trial court granted an appeal
2. 350 Mo. 942, 944, 169 S. W. (2d) 377, 378 (1943).
3. 351 Mo. 317, 320, 172 S. W. (2d) 937, 939 (1943).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1944
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to the supreme court, but in 1942 the latter court, in a very brief opinion,4
transferred the case to the Springfield Court of Appeals because it found
"... no affirmative showing of record that the amount in dispute exceeds
$7500." When the case reached the Springfield Court of Appeals that court
discharged its own duty of determining its jurisdiction because, as was said
in its opinion, 5 ". . . jurisdiction cannot be conferred on this court by agreement, and we do not believe even by the order of the supreme court, unless
we actually have such jurisdiction." After analyzing the record the opinion
of the Springfield Court of Appeals states: "We have come to the conclusion
that such transfer was inadvertent and that the supreme court must have
overlooked the allegations of the amended petition fixing the value of the
property at about $95,000, and we believe that appellate jurisdiction lies
only in the supreme court, because the amount in dispute in the case exceeds
$7500." Holding that the supreme court is not bound by its previous statement of its want of appellate jurisdiction in transferring a case to a court
of. appeals and that, should the supreme court later conclude that it has inadvertently transferred the case to the court of appeals ". . . there is no
reason, under its former holding, why the supreme court could not later
quash our opinion on the merits, should that court hereafter conclude that
this court had no appellate jurisdiction," the case was ordered re-transferred
to the supreme court for want of jurisdiction in the court of appeals. The
third and final opiniono was written by the supreme court in the year under
review. There the court states: "In view of the fact that this is a trust
estate and not a probated estate of a deceased who might have left debts,
we are of the opinion that the court of appeals is right, and that appellate
jurisdiction is in this court. Neither do we think our former decision on the
same question is res adjudicata. Since this court alone has jurisdiction, it is
our duty 'to exercise it."
In contrast to the final decision in the Odom case, where the value of
the trust estate involved was not subject to diminution by possible allowable
claims against the estate, the case of Gee vs. Bess, 7 an appeal in a will contest where no real estate was involved, was transferred to the court of appeals because, although there was evidence tending to show that prior to the
death of the testator he owned personal property of the value of $16,000,
4.
5.
6.
7.

159
170
351
171

S. W. (2d) 686 (Mo. 1943).
S. W. (2d) 589 (Mo. 1943).
Mo. 609, 614, 173 S. W. (2d) 826, 829 (1943).
S. W. (2d) 672 (Mo. 1943).
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there was no' proof as to the value of the estate at the time of death and
the claims, if any, allowed by the probate court were not in evidence. Similarly, in In re Arnold's Estate,8 a guardianship proceeding, the. case was
transferred to the court of appeals because there was no showing in the
record that a sum in excess of the jurisdiction of the court of appeals is
involved, the court again stating that jurisdiction cannot be conferred by
the acquiescence of the parties, and that there must be an affirmative showing of the proper jurisdictional amount in order to have the appeal deter
mined by the supreme court.
In Bearup vs. Equitable Life Assuirance Society,9 a suit on an insurance
policy where the beneficiary sought recovery of a $5,000 death benefit plus
$500 for vexatious refusal to pay and $2500 attorneys' fees, the court retained jurisdiction as against the contention that the claims of the insurer
for vexatious refusal to pay are sham and colorable. In so holding, the court
states: "The cited cases do not rule the precise issue, which, somewhat novel,
may possess merit. Our review of cases treating of the merits indicates that
conflicting remarks exist in different opinions; remarks that cannot be
harmonized if they be followed to their logical conclusions, with results
reached in the several cases. The case is before us on a demurrer to the
petition, admitting the truth of the facts well pleaded. We think we may
not say that the existing state of the law is so stare decisis on the precise
issue on the merits.. . ."as to justify a ruling that the claim for vexatious delay is colorable only. It is probable that a different result would have been
reached if the appeal had been from the merits rather than from a demurrer
to the petition which, as is said in the opinion, admits the truth of the facts
well pleaded.
That a different result might have been reached in the Bearup case if
the appeal had been on the merits, is well illustrated by the decision in
Bell vs. Wagner4 0 where the appeal followed a demurrer to the evidence.
The Bell case was a damage suit where the recovery sought was in an
amount beyond the jurisdiction of the court of appeals but there was no
evidentiary support for the claim of loss of good will of the business and the
value thereof, and the jurisdictional amount did not affirmatively appear
from the record and the case was transferred to the court of appeals. The
8. 174 S. W. (2d) 377 (Mo. 1943).
9. 351 Mo. 326, 329, 172 S. W. (2d) 942, 944 (1943).
10. 169 S. W. (2d) 374 (Mo. 1943).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1944
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precise point involved was that, while the value of the good *ill of a going
business may be established by proof of the net profits of that business for
one year, proof of the difference between the cost price and the selling pri'ce
of the merchandise sold during the year does not establish the net profit in
the absence of proof as to operating costs and overhead.
In Nemours vs. City of Clayton, supra, an appeal from a judgment
denying injunctive relief against the maintenance and operation of automatic
traffic signals, jurisdiction of the supreme court was not saved by the claim
that plaintiff's property cost in excess of $7500 of its present value and that
the traffic had diminished its value by that amount, the court holding that
this evidence of damages was entirely too speculative to establish damaged
within the jurisdictional amount.
In Bragg vs. Ross," a second appeal in a case originally involving title
to real estate, it was held that the first appeal settled the question of title
and that the second trial was only for the purpose or taking an accounting
between the parties which had been ordered by the first appeal, and, since
that accounting involved an amount less than $7500 jurisdiction of the
second appeal was properly in the court of appeals, to which court the case
was transferred.
The fact that the constitution gives the supreme court jurisdiction over
appeals where any state officer is a party continues to present some difficulty
in cases involving commissions, board and administrative bureaus. A distinction is drawn between boards created as corporate entities and boards
or bureaus functioning only through their members. The Public Service
Commission is a corporate entity clothed with the power to sue and be sued
as such; consequently, as was again held in American Petroleum Exchange
vs. Public Service Commi'sion,"2 it is not a state officer in the jurisdictional
sense and the jurisdiction of the supreme court does not attach by reason
of the fact that the Public Service Commission may be a party to the appeal. On the other hand, the Unemployment Compensation Commission,
although authorized by statute 3 to have an official seal which shall be
judicially noticed, has not been created as a public corporate entity and
there is no statute authorizing the commission as such to sue and be sued
as is the case with the Public Service Commission, the State Highway Com11.
12.
13.

173 S. W. (2d) 415 (Mo 1943).
172 S. W. (2d) 952 (Mo. 1943).
Section 9426 (a) Mo. REv. STAT. (1939).
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mission, the Workmen's Compensation Commission and the State Social
Security Commission. Since, therefore, it is the members of the Unemployment Compensation Commission who are to sue or be sued, and these members are state officers, the court, in Trianon Hotel Company vs. Keitel,1
held that the proper jurisdiction of appeals to which they are parties is in
the supreme court.
The question of whether or not title to real estate is involved in the
jurisdictional sense is one that is not controlled by the mere form of the
action. For example, in Peatman vs. Worthington Drainage District,15 the
action was in the form of an action to quiet and determine title, but the
only issue joined by the pleading was whether or not the defendant had a
lien upon land, title to which was admittedly in plaintiff, for the enforcement of certain drainage district taxes. Reaffirming the well settled rule
that actions to determine the existence or non-existence of liens on real
estate are not actions involving title in the jurisdictional sense, the case
was transferred to the court of appeals. Conversely, the supreme court
retained jurisdiction in Riley vs. La Font,16 an action in ejectment which,
ordinarily, is a posses'sory action only and does not try title, notwithstanding
the fact that there was nothing in the pleadings presenting any issue which
would require that title be determined. Indeed, the case was reversed because the judgment appealed from determined title and was, therefore,
beyond the scope of the pleadings.
Title to real estate is not involve& in the jurisdictional sense unless
directly, and not merely incidentally involved. While a proceeding to establish, a private roadvyay involves title to real estate in the jurisdictional sense,
the case of Hall vs. Gernhardt17 was transferred to the court of appeals
because it was a proceeding for an injunction against interference with
the use of a private roadway, the existence of which was admitted, the exact
location thereof being the matter in dispute. While it was necessary to determine whether or not plaintiff had the easement claimed in order to be
entitled to injunctive relief, the determination of that question was held to
be only incidental to the question of granting or refusing injunctive relief.
But, in City of Kirkwood vs. Venable,'8 a condemnation proceeding, where
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

350
168
174
171
351

Mo. 1041, 169 S. W. (2d) 891 (1943).
S. W. (2d) 57 (Mo. 1943).
S. W. (2d) 857 (Mo. 1943).
S. W. (2d) 669 (Mo. 1943).
Mo. 460, 173 S. W. (2d) 8 (1943).
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the power and authority of the city to condemn was the issue,,it was held
that title to real estate is directly involved and the supreme court retained
jurisdiction. However, in Turley vs. Matthews, 9 a suit in equity to recover
the proceeds of a partition sale, the court held that title to the land was not
in dispute, the issue being only the ownership of the money proceeds from
the sale the validity of which was not questioned, and transferred the case
to the court of appeals.
The constitutional requirement2o that when the court of appeals shall
render a decision which one of the judges shall deem contrary to previous
decisions of one of the courts of appeals or of the supreme court, the case
must be certified and transferred to the supreme court received consideration in Knorp vs. Thompson.21 In that case the court of appeals had rendered an opinion in which all of the judges concurred in result but which
one of the judges deemed to be in conflict with previous decisions of the
supreme court. Following earlier decisions, the supreme court held that the
constitution is not concerned with the rights of the litigants but only with
the principles of law involved and that it is harmony of doctrine and adjudication which this clause of the constitution was framed to safeguard.
Accordingly, a motion to re-transfer the case to the court of appeals was
overruled. The same ruling was made in Hutchison vs. Thompson, 22 a companion case.
ABSTRACT AND BRIEF

During the year under review the court found it necessary to dismiss
only one appeal for failure to comply with its rules. In Gellot vs. Stein22
appellant's brief contained eleven assignments of error and three propositions under points and authorities. All of them were mere abstract statements of principles of law without any reference to their applicability to the
issues in the case to be reviewed. Again announcing the well settled rule
that it is not the province of the reviewing court to search the record for
matters assigned as error the court declared the deficiencies of the brief
more pronounced than in previous cases in which appeals had been dismissed, and enforced its rule by dismissal of that appeal. So, also, while the
appeal was not dismissed in Cook vs. Day24 the court declined to consider a
19. 172 S. W. (2d) 936 (Mo. 1943).
20. Mo. CONST. Art. VI, § 6, AMEND. Of 1884.
21. 175 S. W. (2d) 889 (Mo. 1943).
22. 175 S. W. (2d) 903 (Mo. 1943).
23. 174 S. W. (2d) 174 (Mo. 1943).
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number of abstract legal propositions set out in appellant's brief under points
and authorities, and affirmed the judgment after reviewing issues which had
been properly raised. The court declined to dismiss the appeal in Coleman
vs. Crescent Instdated Wire and Cable Company25 upon the ground of
argumentative statements of fact in the brief, holding that, after comparison
of the brief with the abstract, there was nothing to show that counsel for
appellant had purposely misstated facts to mislead the court.
In Lemmon vs. Continental Casualty Company 2 the bill of exceptions
contained a statement in narrative form, taken from the notes and papers of
the attorney, in lieu of the testimony of all of the witnesses except two.
The court declined to dismiss the appeal on that ground holding that "there
is no statute; ruling or rule, so far as we know, that requires an appellant,
in making up the bill of exceptions, to insert, for the evidence, a transcript
of the reporter." The court held that the record thus presented contained
all of the evidence necessary to a determination of the questions presented
for decision and was not violative of rule 13 of the court. Likewise, the court
refused to dismiss the appeal for violation of its rule in Trieseler vs. Helm.bacher 7 on the ground that the abstract of the record brought up the testimony in narrative form in an equity case. While the court stated that it
would have been better if certain testimony had been set forth in question
and answer form because a decision depends upon the credibility of witnesses
it was held that the abstract is not so faulty as to merit such drastic action
as the dismissal of the appeal. It was also held that it was respondent's
duty to file an additional abstract if not satisfied-and that respondent is not
entitled to refer in printed argument to testimony transcribed in the bill of
exceptions and not brought up by additional abstract of the record.
THE RIGHT OF APPEAL

While the right of appeal is not dependent upon the filing of a bill of
exceptions in the court below, it was again pointed out in In re Hukreda's
Estate28 that the failure to present a bill of exceptions in the court below
preserves nothing for review except errors appearing upon the record proper.
It is important to note that, while in ordinary actions, the time for taking an appeal begins to run from the date of the overruling of a motion for
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

172 S. W. (2d) 648 (Mo. 1943).
350 Mo. 781, 168 S. W. (2d) 1060 (1943).
350 Mo. 1107, 1110, 169 S. W. (2d) 920, 921 (1943).
350 Mo. 807, 168 S. W. (2d.) 1030 (1943).
12 S. W. (2d) 824 (Mo. 1943).
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new trial, that rule is not applicable in those cases where the statute makes
2l
no provision for motion for new trial. In J. M. FarrinCompany vs. Murpthy
the action was one to review an order of the Unemployment Compensation
Commission. After the trial court had affirmed the award of the commission
a motion entitled "Motion For New Trial and Rehearing" was filed in the
circuit court but was not ruled upon by that court until the term following
the term at which the original judgment had been entered. Because the proceeding is one entirely governed by the statute, and there is no statutory
provision for in6tion for new trial, the court was compelled to dismiss the
appeal because not taken in time.
The right of appeal exists only from a final judgment. In Fenton vs.
Thompson,30 plaintiff took a voluntary nonsuit after the jury had retired
and before it had returned a verdict. The court entered a judgment of dismissal without reciting whether or not the dismissal was with prejudice.
Thereupon the defendant appealed contending that the trial court erred
in not dismissing the cause with prejudice. In the supreme court the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the appeal upon the ground that there was no
final judgment from which an appeal could be taken and upon the further
ground that since the cause was dismissed the appellant was not an aggrieved party. The court held that the judgment of the circuit court, not
being a dismissal with prejudice, was necessarily a dismissal without prejudice and that the defendant is a party aggrieved thereby and entitled to
appeal. On the merits, the court held that the trial court erred in not dismissing with prejudice.
In Urie vs. Thompson 31 the trial court sustained a demurrer to plaintiff's petition and plaintiff filed an affidavit for appeal. Thereafter, and at
the same term, the previous order of the court was on its own motion set
aside and a new order was entered sustaining the demurrer reciting that
plaintiff refuses to plead further and entering judgment for defendant.
Plaintiff then refiled his application and affidavit for appeal. The supreme
court refused to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the affidavit was
sworn to before the date from which the judgment was appealed. The ruling
is based upon the fact that the defect was not called to the attention of
the trial court.

29. 351 Mo. 77, 171 S. W. (2d) 668 (1943).
30. 176 S. W. (2d) 456 (Mo. 1943).
31. 176 S. W. (2d) 471 (Mo. 1943).
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CRIMINAL LAW
LAWRENCE HOLMAN*

The fifty-two criminal cases decided by the supreme court during the
period under review, represents a substantial increase over the number
determined during 1942. As usual, most of the cases were disposed of by
the application of established rules of law to the facts involved in the particular cause. This review will not be burdened by reference to these cases,
unless they involve some particularly interesting, or novel situation. For
several years, it has appeared to the writer that there has been a definite
tendency on the part of the court to minimize the importance of form, and
relax the great strictness and technical accuracy required at common law.'
During 1943, the opinions indicate very little, if any, progress toward that
goal.
I.

PRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS

2

In State v. Neal, it appeared that a motion to quash the information
was taken up "by consent," and overruled while defendant was absent from
the courtroom, he being at that time, confined in jail. He complained of this
in his motion for new trial and on appeal, assigned same as error. Section
4054, Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1939, provides that "no person indicted
for a felony can be tried unless he be personally present during the trial ...
The obvious question was, whether the hearing of the motion to quash the
information is a part of the trial. If so, the statute is mandatory, aid appellant's counsel could not consent to his absence. The opinion contains an
interesting review of the cases on this subject, and reaches the conclusion
that ordinarily, the impaneling of the jury is the first step in the trial. It is
suggested that the word "trial" includes all those steps in the trial during
which the defendant may be of assistance to his counsel, in conducting the
proceedings. Such would not include the motion to quash an information,
since it raises purely legal questions. It was therefore held that, under such
statute, appellant's presence was not necessary during this proceeding. It
was pointed out, however, that had he requested and been denied the privilege of being present, it would have been a violation of Section 22, Article
II, of the Constitution, which provides that the accused "shall have the
*Attorney, Moberly, Missouri, LL.B., University of Missouri, 1929.
1. Note (1943) Mo. L. REv. 235.
2. 350 Mo. 1002, 169 S.W. (2d) 686 (1943).
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right to appear and defend in person and by counsel." This provision would

apparently apply to all of the proceedings connected with the prosecution,
but it can'be waived.
II. ThE TRiAL
A. Jurors
8
There were two interesting questions decided in State v. Thomas, con4
cerning the relationship of jurors to the interested parties. The statute provides that "... . neither the injured party nor any person of kin to him shall
be a competent juror on the trial, nor shall any person of kin to the prosecutor or defendant in any case serve as a juror on the trial thereof." The
first point raised was, that a certain juror was a brother-in-law of a brotherin-law of the prosecutrix. It was held that a kinship by affinity exists only
between each spouse and the blood relatives of the other spouse and therefore, thisjuror was not related in any degree to the prosecutrix. A more
serious problem was presented in regard to another juror. It was discovered
at the beginning of the second day of the trial, that the juror was a second
cousin of the appellant by affinity. The appellant challenged the juror, and
moved for a mistrial. The statute does not define the degree of kin which
will disqualify, nor had any previous decision determined the question. The
opinion contains a very fine discussion of the problem, and concludes by
adopting the so-called Georgia doctrine to the effect that relationships under
the statute shall be reckoned by the civil law rule, which would disqualify
a juror if related by consanguinity or affinity, within the ninth degree. This
included the relationship in this case, and, in fact, would even disqualify
a third cousin by affinity. It was further held, however, that the relationship being with the appellant, he could not complain, the court adopting
the general rule that the juror is subject to disqualification upon the challenge of the adverse party.

B. ConstitutionalQuestions
The writer has only found one case which directly involved a constitutional question. In State v. Taylor,5 an information was filed in the lower
court, charging the defendant with employing female workers to work at
physical labor in a manufacturing establishment in Boone County, for a
3. 351 Mo. 804, 174 S. W. (2d) 337 (1943).
4. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 4057.
5. 351 Mo. 725, 173 S. W. (2d) 902 (1943).
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period-in excess of nine hours, in violation of the statute.6 Defendant filed
a motion .to quash, challenging the constitutionality of the statute, which
was sustained, and the state appealed. The statute contained a proviso that
it should not apply to towns or cities having a population of 3,000 inhabitants
or less. The respondent's whole case was founded upon the contention that
said proviso made the statute a local and special law, regulating labor, and
therefore disciiminatory, and in violation of due process, guaranteed by the
constitution. In state, on appeal, conceded that this provision (which was
added by amendment long after the original enactment) was void, but contended that the amendment alone was void, and that the original statute
was valid, as it applied throughout the whole state, without any discrimination, so far as manufacturing establishments are concerned. This point was
not raised in the lower court. The opinion states that there can be no logical
reason for granting the exemption set out in the proviso, and the trial court
was therefore right in holding the section unconstitutional. The court stated
that the contention of the state presented a very serious question, but that
as the constitutional validity of the above-mentioned proviso was not challenged in the trial court, it could not be considered on appeal. It seems to
the writer that, in view of the vast public interest in the determination of
the constitutionality of statutes, the court might well have disregarded tlie
fact that the state did not present its theory in the trial court and proceeded
to determine whether the entire statute, or just the particular proviso, was
unconstitutional.
C. Prosecutions Under Habitual Criminal Act
The appellant, in State v. Humptires,7 was convicted of assault with
intent to kill, and his punishment.fixed at life imprisonment, the prosecution
being under the Habitual Criminal Statute. Complaint was made of the
alleged error of the trial court in overruling appellant's motion to strike from
the information all allegations charging him with being a habitual criminal
and in permitting the state to introduce evidence of his prior conviction.
The grounds for his contention were, that the prior conviction occurred fourteen years before the offense charged and could not be used to aggravate the
punishment, because of the Statute of Limitations and because the offense
was too remote. This was the first time this question had been presented to
the supreme court. Following the decisions in other states, the court very

6. Mo.

REv. STAT. (1939) § 10171.
7. 350 Mo. 938, 169 S. W. (2d) 350.(1943).
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properly held that where the statute fails to fix a maximum time limit
within which the prior conviction shall have occurred, the remoteness of
such conviction is immaterial. The Three Year Statute of Limitations was
also held inapplicable, because the fact of the prior conviction is not an element or part of the subsequent offense, but serves only to increase the
severity of the punishment thereof.
D. Evidence

The appellant's counsel, in State v. Damon,8 requested that the jury
be permitted to take all of the exhibits with them upon retirement to consider their verdict. The state objected and the court refused the request.
Appellant's counsel thereupon inquired if the court was exercising its disI
cretion in refusing the request. The court replied, "'Certainly not ....
exhibits
to
objects
the
defendant
Siate
or
the
.
.
.
if
either
have no discretion

going to the jury I cannot allow them to go."' The case was reversed and
remanded, the court holding that the trial judge could, in the exercise of his
sound discretion, permit the exhibits to be taken to the jury room, and he
apparently denied the request solely because of a mistaken idea of the law.
In State v. Bagges,9 the appellant's attorney, on the "first day of the
trial, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, ad testiflcantrm. The petition was sustained and writ issued. On the second day of the trial, the court
revoked the writ, because the attorney for appellant would not agree to confine his examination of the convict, to the offer of proof made at the hearing
of the application. This was held to be error, the court stating that under
the statutes and constitution, appellant was entitled to process that would
compel this witness to appear at the trial. It was pointed out that if the
appellant sought to elicit irrelevant testimony, the trial court could prevent
it in the orderly procedure of conducting the trial.
The appellant, in State v. Lyles,1 ° complained of the action of the trial
court, in permitting the state to reopen the case after the appellant had
closed (he not having offered any evidence) and present witnesses to the
effect that the defendant, by his actions during the trial, was feigning insanity. The appellant did not formally interpose the defense of insanity,
but his demonstrations could only be interpreted as manifestations of a disordered mind. Under these circumstances, it was held that the state was
8. 350 Mo. 949, 169 S. W. (2d) 382 (1943).
9. 350 Mo. 984, 169 S. W. (2d) 407 (1943).
10. 351 Mo. 1174, 175 S. W. (2d) 587 (1943).
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not required to remain silent and permit such exhibitions to go unchallenged,
when it had ample proof to show their real nature. The feigning of a state
of mind has previously been held'1 to indicate a disposition to evade justice
and tends to prove guilt.

E. Inqstrutions
During 1943, more criminal cases were reversed because of error in the
instructions than for any other cause. Five cases'2 were reversed and remanded because of the giving of an instruction relating to voluntaiy statements alleged to have been made by the defendant in relation to the offense
charged, providing in part, ".

.

. You must consider such statements alto-

gether . *. . what the defendant said against himself, if anything, the law

presumes to be true, ur~less negatived by some other evidence in the cause,
because said against himself. What the defendant said for himself, the
jury are not bound to believe,'. . but the jury may believe or disbelieve it
as it is shown to be true or false by the evidence ....

"

In each of these cases,

the only statements proved by the state to have been made by the appellant,
were unfavorable to him. The instruction therefore, was condemned, because
it directs the jury's particular attention to certain parts of the state's evidence and states the presumption of law or the inference of fact to which
the evidence gives rise, and at the same time calls upon the jury to weigh
the defendant's evidence on the same subject, when there is none. Similar
instructions were approved over a long period of time by the supreme
court.' 3 However, in State v. Duncan,"' decided in 1935, an almost identical
instruction was declared to be error, under circumstances similar to those
existing in the cases now under consideration. It is rather difficult to understand why prosecuting officials continue to ask for, and trial courts to give,
such instructions. This instruction has been so strongly criticized, that it is
doubtful whether or not it could safely be given under any state of facts.
Two cases' 5 were reversed and remanded because of the giving of an
instruction requiring the defendant to prove the defense of alibi. There are
11. State v. Stevens, 242 Mo. 439 (1912).
12. State v. Krauss, 171 S. W. (2d) 699 (Mo. 1943). State v. Robertson, 351
Mo. 159, 171 S. W. (2d) 718 (1943). State v. Talbert, 351 Mo. 791, 174 S. W.
(2d) 718 (1943). State v. Cole, 174 S. W. (2d) 172 (Mo. 1943). State v. Lyles,
supra note 10.
13. State v. Hamilton, 263 S. W. 127 (Mo. 1924). State v. Lewis, 20 S. W.
(2d) 172 (Mo. 1929).
14. 80 S. W. (2d) 147 (Mo. 1935).
15. State v. Hubbard, 351 Mo. 143, 171 S. W. (2d) 701 (1943). State v.
Jones, 174 S. W. (2d) 797 (Mo. 1943).
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cases in this state holding that alibi is an affirmative defense, but the cases
under consideration are such as require the personal presence of the defendant
at the place of the crime at the time it was committed. It is therefore held
that it is a part of the state's case to prove these facts beyond a reasonable
doubt, and an instruction requiring the defendant to prove that he was not
at the scene of the crime when it was committed is erroneous.
It has long been the custom and practice in felony cases, to instruct the
jury that if they found the defendant committed the act charged at any
time within three years prior to the date of filing the information, they should
convict. State v. Hamlin,16 is an interesting example of an error committed
in following that practice. All of the evidence was to the effect that the
theft was committed on June 30, 193-9. The defense was alibi. The main
instruction permitted the jury to find the defendant guilty if they found he
committed the theft on or about June 30, 1939, or at any time within three
years before the 29th day of August, 1939 (date of filing information). The
alibi instruction, in effect, required the jury to find the appellant at the
scene of the crime on June 30. The instructions were contradictory, tend
to confuse the jury, and fail to hold them to the point in issue.
In State v. Murrell,17 the appellant was charged with assault with malice
aforethought. The court also instructed on two lesser degrees of assault.
The defense was insanity. A conviction of assault with malice aforethought
was reversed and the cause remanded, because of an instruction on insanity
which assumed appellant guilty of the offense charged, ignoring that he
might have been guilty of the lesser offenses, the instruction using the following language: "... if they (the jury) find that, at the time he did the

acts charged in the second count of the information, the defendant was so
deranged .... "
A conviction of murder in the first degree was reversed and remanded
in the case of State v. Wright,:" because of the failure of the trial court to
give a self-defense instruction. Division two of the court originally affirmed
the sentence but later, on its own motion, transferred the case to the court
en banc, where two of the judges failed to concur in the final result. The
writer is of the opinion that the decision originally made by division two, was
correct, for the reasons set out in the dissenting opinion written by Judge
Hyde. There was ample direct evidence to prove the state's case, inde16. 351 Mo. 157, 171 S. W. (2d) 716 (1943).
17. 169 S. W. (2d) 409, 412 (Mo. 1943).
18. 175 S. W. (2d) 866 (Mo. 1943).
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pendent of a confession made by appellant to the police shortly after his
arrest. The state, however, introduced the confession, probably for the purpose of proving ownership of a knife, apparently used in committing the
homicide. The statements in the confession furnished a foundation for the
defense of self-defense. However, the appellant testified, completely repudiating the confession, and told a story denying any connection with the
homicide and, therefore, negativing self-defense. The majority opinion held
that the appellant had a right to have the jury consider that part of the confession favorable to him, even though he repudiated the statement and it was
inconsistent with his testimony at the trial. The state also contended at
the trial that the part of the confession which would have furnished a basis
for the self-defense issue, was not true. It would seem that to submit this
issue to the jury would be to authorize the jury to find a state of facts to be
true which both parties in the case say is not true. This would seem to be
going a long way towards protecting the rights of a defendant.
F. Verdict, Jusdgment and Sentence
The jury, in State v. Huff,19 returned the following verdict: "'We, the
jury in the above entitled cause, find the defendant, Leonard Huff, guilty
of burglary and larceny as he stands charged by the information in this case
and we fix his punishment therefor at 2 (two) years in the Penitentiary on
the Burglary charge, and . . . years in the Penitentiary on the Larceny
Charge.'" The trial court merely sentenced the defendant to two years on
the burglary charge. The defendant (probably to his regret) appealed.
The supreme court held that tfie trial judge, the jury not having agreed on
the punishment for larceny, should have fixed the punishment on that charge
and so sentenced the defendant thereon, as well as on the burglary charge.
The appeal was held premature and the judgment reversed and cause remanded, with directions to the circuit court to proceed accordingly.
G. Apped
Appellant was convicted of a misdemeanor, in State v. Powers,2 0 but
an appeal was allowed to the supreme court, apparently because of a constitutional question. Appellants motion for new trial did not mention any
constitutional question but did assign as error, the court's action in overrulig his motion to suppress evidence. It appeared that this motion to sup19. 173 S. W. (2d) 895 (Mo. 1943).
20. 350 Mo. 942, 169 S. W. (2d) 377 (1943).
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press was based on the violation of the defendant's constitutional rights.
The supreme court held this assignment too vague to preserve the issue, and
held that to keep a constitutional question alive, it had to be specifically
mentioned in the motion for new trial. The cause was therefore transferred
to the court of appeals.
EVIDENCE
The MissouRI LAW REviEw regrets that it is unable to review the
decisions of the Missouri Supreme Court in this important field this year.
In another year the contributor who undertakes this section may be able
to extend his review to include the significant decisions of 1943.
HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE
Lt. (j. G.) William Becker, whose discussion of the Missouri Supreme
Court decisions enunciating and applying the humanitarian doctrine has
appeared in the annual survey of the work of the court since its inception,
entered the armed forces of the United States at a time when it was not
possible for him to complete the article this year, as he had planned to do.
The MISSOURI LAW REviEw looks forward to the resumption of his contributions, at which time he will note significant decisions rendered in 1943.

INSURANCE
ORRiN-B. EVANS*

I. FOREIGN' LAW
The most interesting case decided by the Missouri Supreme Court in
1943 in the field of insurance, was Bearup v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States,1 a suit on the double indemnity for accidental

death provision of an insurance policy. The insured had committed suicide
while insane, which by the law of Missouri is regarded as accidental death.
The New York law, which defendant contended was applicable, is contra.
Under familiar principles, the issue before the court was the state in which

*Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri, B.A., University of
Wisconsin, 1931; LL.B., 1935; J.S.D., Yale University, 1940.
1. 351 Mo. 326, 328, 172 S. W. (2d) 942, 943 (1943).
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the contract was made. The insured applied for insurance in Kansas City,
Missouri, upon a form which recited that the policy to be issued should not
take effect until the first premium had been paid during the applicant's good
health, and that only the insurer's president, vice president, secretary, treasurer or other home office official had power to make or modify the contract
or waive any of the insurer's requirements. However, at the time of application the insured paid the amount of the first annual premium to the local
agent and received from him a binder-receipt which read "'insurance ...
shall take effect as of the date of this receipt, provided satisfactory part II
of the application is furnished to the society and provided the applicant
is on this date in the opinion of the society's authorized officers in New
York, an insurable risk under its rules and the application is otherwise
acceptable on the plan and for the amount and at the rate of. premium applied for; otherwise the payment evidenced by this receipt shall be returned
on demand and surrender of this receipt .... '" That the several conditions
of the binder-receipt were satisfied is clear from the fact that the policy
applied for was duly issued and dated as of the time of application. Death
occurred some five years later.
The supreme court held that the contract was completed in New York,
that New York law applied, and that there could be no recovery under the
accidental death provisions. By the terms of the contract, delivery was not
essential to the taking effect of the contract because of the binder-receipt,
but there could be no contract until the offer-i.e., the application-was
accepted, and only the officers in New York had power to accept it.
Suppose the applicant had committed suicide while insane before the
application reached the home office in New York, or before it had been acted
upon in any way by the home office, and that no policy was ever issued, but
that all the conditions of the binder-receipt had been satisfied. I think it is
clear that the officials in New York could not arbitrarily refuse to issue the
policy under the terms of the binder-receipt, if the applicant, by objective
standards, was at the time of application an insurable risk for the policy
applied for. Under those circumstances, it would seem that recovery could be
had2 and it could hardly be contended that it was anything but a Missouri
contract. The rationalization would have to be that in spite ofthe language of
the application form, the company had, by furnishing its agents with the
2. See Wolfskill v. American Union Life Ins. Co., 172 S. W. (2d) 471 (Mo.
App. 1943).
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binder-receipt forms and authorizing their use, empowered the agents to
accept offers for insurance and to complete insurance contracts, subject to
subsequent investigation of conditions which were existing at the time of
the application. This rationalization would seem equally applicable to the
facts of the Bearup case. No one would contend that an application does
not have to be accepted. The question is whether or not, by giving the agent
authority to issue the binder-receipt, it had not given him power to complete the contract of insurance, subject to the subsequent disapproval on
objective grounds. It is well settled that the policy is not itself the contract
but merely evidence of the contract.
II. CONSTRUCTION OF POLICY

In Fields v. Pyramid Life Insurance Company of Topeka, Kansas," the
policy sued upon contained a provision for double indemnity in case of
accidental death, but by the terms of the policy, such double indemnity was
payable only if the death resulted from bodily injuries and " '... shall not be
the result of homicide, nor be caused directly or indirectly by self-destruction
while sane or insane, poisoning . . .'" etc. The insured killed himself by

taking poison while insane. The plaintiff relied upon the Missouri doctrine
that suicide while insane is accidental death, and upon Section 5852, Missouri
Revised Statutes, 1939, that "in all suits upon policies of insurance upon
life ...

it shall be no defense that the insured committed suicide . . . and

any stipulation of the policy to the contrary will be void." The court, however, pointed out that the policy excepted liability for death from poisoning,
whether the poisoning were intentional or accidental, whether self-inflicted
or the act of a third party, whether the insured were sane or insane, and held
that there was no prohibition against such an exclusion. The iuling seems
absolutely sound.
But it was held there was no room for construction of the policy in
Broadway Laundry Company v. New York Life Insurance Company,4 a
suit upon a term policy of seven years issued July 2, 1934, for which application had been made June 19, 1934, where the insured died June 28, 1941.
The application, which was made part of the policy, provided that the insurance should not take effect unless and until the policy was delivered to
and received by the applicant and the first premium paid in full during his
3.
4.

176 S. W. (2d) 281 (Mo. 1943).
351 Mo. 278, 172 S. W. (2d) 851 (1943).
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lifetime. The policy read "'this policy takes effect as of the 19th day of
June, 1934, which day is the anniversary of the policy,'" and expired seven
years from its date. The court pointed out that the insured paid for about
a month's insurance which he did not get, but said the terms of the policy
were plain and the insured must be held to his bargain, and ordered judgment for the defendant.
The court distinguished the Halsey' and Howard6 cases on the ground
that they did not involve term insurance. Of course, the particular problem
before the court-whether the policy had expired by the mere passage of
time-could not arise in anything but a term insurance case, but on the
question of whether a policy took effect on the date it bore or on the date
of delivery, it does not appear what difference it should make whether the
policy was for term or whole life insurance. In previous surveys of the
work of the court in the field of insurance, I have called attention to the
fact that on this point the Missouri cases are in irreconcilable conflict. It
appears that the recent decisions are tending to give effect to policy stipulations as to the date of the policy.
In Liederma v. Ivdependent Order of Brith Shzolom,7 plaintiff's decedent
in 1933, when he was 53 years of age, had exchanged a certificate on which
had been accumulated a reserve entitling him to nine years extended insurance in case of suspension for non-payment of dues, for a new certificate
issued "'. . . as of the back dated age of 48, as of the first day of January,
'1929.'" The new certificate contained "non-forfeiture" provisions preserving
. for
to the insured the reserve values after payment had been duly made "'...
a period of three years or more from the actual date of issue hereof, and
dating back by reason of accumulated credits not being taken into consideration in the calculation of said period. . . .'" The insured was suspended for
non-payment of dues in 1935 and died in 1937. The court of appeals found
the certificate ambiguous and, construing it most favorably to the insured,
computed the required three years from January 1, 1929, thus making available a reserve which could provide extended insurance after the insured's
suspension. On certification to the supreme court by a dissenting judge, the
case was reversed, the court holding that there was no ambiguity in the

5. Halsey v. American Central Life Ins. Co., 258 Mo: 659, 167 S. W. 951
(1914).
6. Howard v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 164 S. W. (2d) (Mo. 1942).
7. 351 Mo.658, 660, 173 S.W. (2d) 848, 849 (1943).
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certificate and that the decision below violated the previous ruling of the
supreme court that unambiguous language must be given its plain meaning.
III. PREMIUMS

The total cost per annum of insurance on which the premiums are paid
annually, semi-annually, quarterly, or monthly becomes progressively greater. Because premiums are usually paid in advance of the anticipated losses,
which on an average are distributed throughout the premium payment
period, in the calculation of premiums an allowance is made for the interest
which the money will earn the insurer while held by it prior to claims for
loss. It is obvious that the shorter the time when the premium money is held
before it is used to pay losses, the less income derived from it by investments, hence the less discount which can be allowed. However the practice of insurers of charging a greater differential in premium than the investments of the insurer can reasonably bring has often excited unfavorable
comment. Nevertheless, such differential does not violate the usury laws.
Payment of premiums to companies operating under a stipulated premium
plan is not an obligation of the insured; it is simply the performance of a
condition precedent to liability of the insurer. Not being an obligation, there
is no room for application of the usury law, and there is no law or regulation
of insurance which limits the differential which the insurer may make between annual and semi-annual premium payments.'
IV.

SETTLEMENTS

The, effectiveness of a release given by the beneficiary of an insurance
policy as part of a settlement of a disputed claim for less than the total
amount payable by the beneficiary's contention may depend upon the
knowledge of the insurer at the time of settlement. There is consideration
for the release if at that time the insurer has knowledge which would support, though not necessarily compel, a verdict in his favor if the case were
then put before a jury. However, evidence gathered by an insurer subsequent to the execution of the release, which evidence is sufficient to support
a jury verdict, is immaterial in determining the validity of the releaseY
By the same reasoning, in determining whether an insurer may be
liable for vexatious delay, the court must look to the knowledge of the in8. Robb v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 351 Mo. 1037, 174 S. W. (2d) 832

(1943).

9. Foster v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 176 S. NV. (2d) 482
(Mo. 1943).
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surer at the time the insured's claim is denied. Here also, evidence which
would justify a reasonable doubt of the validity of the plaintiff's claim, obtained after the refusal to pay, is irrelevant.' 0 (Of course, if the evidence is
sufficient to defeat the claim altogether, there can be no question .of vexatious
delay.)
V. ACCIDENTAL DEATH
The Missouri rule that suicide while insane shall be considered accidental death has already been referred to. It is inevitable that litigation will
arise over the existence of insanity and over the various types of mental and
psychiatric abnormalities which will call the rule into play. The mere fact
of suicide is not enough to support a verdict of suicide while insane. However, the insanity contemplated by the rule is not limited merely to the condition in which the insured was unable to distinguish the moral character of
suicide but includes also the insane impulse of one unable to control or determine his conduct rationally.1

PROPERTY

G. V.

HEAD*

Davidson v. Davidson.' involves the interpretation and effect of a deed
from Andrew C. Davidson to John Davidson, his son. The deed conveyed
the land therein described to the son and the heirs of his body, and provided
that the premises shall revert to the grantor or become part of his estate
in the event that John dies without bodily heirs. Subsequent to the execution and delivery of the deed the grantor died intestate, leaving John as his
only heir. John married, but had no children, and died intestate, survived
by his widow. In a suit for partition brought against John's widow by the
collateral heirs of Andrew C. Davidson, the widow is held to be the sole
owner of the real estate covered by the deed.
10. State ex rel. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n. v. Hughes, 351

Mo. 1081, 174 S. W. (2d) 859 (1943).

11. Lemmon v. Continental Casualty Co., 350 Mo. 1107, 169 S. W. (2d) 920

(1943).

PROPERTY

*General Counsel, Farm Credit Administration of St. Louis, formerly Professor of Law, University of Missouri. A.B.; University of Missouri, 1914; LL.B.,
Harvard, 1917; S.J.D., Harvard, 1932.
1. 167 S. W. (2d) 641 (1943).
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The decision is obviously sound. The estate tail which the deed purported to create was converted by Revised Statutes of Missouri 1939, Section
3498, into an estate for life in John, with a contingent remainder in the heirs
of his body, the reversion in fee remaining in the grantor pending the vesting of the contingent remainder. Upon the death of Andrew intestate, the
reversion descended to his only heir, John. Upon John's death without bodily
heirs, the contingent remainder to the heirs of his body terminated. The
reversion in fee which John inherited from Andrew passed on John's death
to his widow, since John died intestate, wtih no father, mother, brother, or
sister or their descendants surviving.
Roy F. Stanrrn Electric Co. v. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. 2 interpretsthe
statute authorizing the filing of a single mechanic's lien for work done under
one general contract on two buildings situated on contiguous lots. The two
buildings in question were on adjoining lots, but were separated by an alley
dedicated to public use. The court holds that since the public acquired, by
the dedication, only an eisement, and since the owner of the lots owned the
fee in the alley, the lots were contiguous within the meaning of the statute,
and only one mechanic's lien was required for the work done on the two
buildings.
The case is interesting primarily because of the court's discussion of
some of the principles of statutory interpretation. It appears that in 1892
and 1899, respectively, the Kansas City Court of Appeals, in Bolen Coal Co.
v. Ryan3 and Missouri Central Lumber Co. v. Sedalia Brewing Co.,4 had

held that lots separated by a public alley were not contiguous for the purposes of the statute. In 1909 the legislature amended the statute by including a reference to an improvement consisting of a continuous sidewalk in
front or alongside of contiguous lots, but otherwise re-enacted the statute
without change. The contention is made that the legislature, by re-enacting
the statute after it had received judicial construction, adopted the interpretation placed uopn it by the courts. The court concedes the existence of such
a general rule, but says the rule applies only where the statute has been
construed by courts of last resort. It states that the court of appeals is a

court of last resort with respect to matters committed to its jurisdiction, but
that the supreme court is a superior court, in nowise bound by the decisions
2. 350 Mo. 1178, 171 S. W. (2d) 580 (1943).
3. 48 Mo. App. 512 (1892).
4. 78 Mo. App. 230 (1899).
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of the court of appeals; and that consequently no basis exists here for a
conclusive presumption that the legislature, in re-enacting the statute without change, intended to adopt the construction placed upon it by the Kansas
City Court of Appeals. The court says that the prior judicial interpretation
is no doubt a circumstance to be duly considered in arriving at the question
of the legislative intent, ". . . but it does not amount to such a positive
legislative sanction of the prior judicial construction of the statute as to
bind us in this case when we are convinced that the whole remedial purpose
of the act can only be served by giving it a construction altogether to the
contrary." 5
The soundness of the court's position seems open to question. Presumably the court means to say that if Bolen Coal Co. v. Ryan and Missouri
CentralLumber Co. v. Sedalia Brewing Co. had been decided by the supreme
court, then there would be a conclusive presumption that the legislature intended to adopt the judicial construction.
Judicial pronouncements to the effect that legislative intention is controlling in the construction of statutes confuse and becloud every issue of
statutory interpretation. What tfie legislature intended but did not say is
quite immaterial. What the legislature said is to be arrived at by ascertaining the meaning of the language of the statute in the light of attendant
circumstances. There is and can be no such thing as the intention of a legislative body. Individual legislatorg may intend; but their intention is not
recorded, nor is it the subject of proof, nor can it be material, except as embodied in the language of the statute. Even if the subjective intention of the
legislators can be inquired into, it seem§ senseless to assume that all or a
substantial number of the legislators in 1909 knew that seventeen years
previously the Kansas City Court of Appeals had held that lots separated
by an alley were "contiguous." And if the decision had been rendered, not
by the Kansas City Court of Appeals, but by the supreme court, the assumption would be quite as preposterous. A former judicial interpretation can be
of significance in the construction of a statute only in so far as it evidences
the meaning of language; and the holding of a lower court might be quite
as efficacious for that purpose as the decision of a court of last resort. If a
justice of the peace used a particular word in a certain sense, and his opinion
gained such notoriety that the word, in general usage, took on the new
5. Roy F. Stamm Electric Co. v. Hamilton Brown Shoe Co., 350 Mo. 1178,
1184, 171 S.W. (2d) 580, 584 (1943).
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meaning promulgated by the justice, that meaning might determine the interpretation of a statute in which the word was subsequently used.
Whether the present case is right on the merits is, for the purposes of
this review, immaterial. But the mere fact that a court-any court-gave
the statute a certain construction prior to its re-enactment, should not control the interpretation of the language of the act.
Petring v. KtIzs 6 holds valid a trustee's sale in foreclosure of a deed of
trust notwithstanding a number of alleged irregularities in the conduct of the
sale. The trustee testified that he did not make the sale. However, he stated
that he "'. . . may have been down to the Real Estate Exchange, . . .'" the
place of sale specified in the deed of trust, on the day the sale was supposedly held. The trustee's deed, however, specifically recited that the trustee made the sale. The Missouri statute makes the recitals in the trustee's
deed prinu facie evidence of the existence of the facts recited. The court
holds that the evidence was not sufficiently clear and satisfactory to rebut
the recitals in the deed. In this connection the court states that although
the trustee need not personally cry the sale, he must be present at the sale,
to observe the progress thereof, to protest the interests of the parties concerned, to reject fraudulent bids, and, if necessary, to adjourn the sale.
A further objection was that the trustee did not order and insert the"
advertisement giving notice of the sale and published over his name. The
court holds that the identity of the person responsible for the publication
of the notice is immaterial so long as the trustee conducts the sale.
The notice of sale and the trustee's deed erroneously stated that the
note was in default as to principal and interest. There was, however, a default in the payment of taxes. The court holds this discrepancy immaterial,
since neither the deed of trust nor the statute required the particular default to be recited.
The sale was alleged to be void because not held at the request of the
holder of the note. The evidence disclosed that the note holder had no knowledge of any default of the mortgagor, and no knowledge of the sale until
years later. However, since the deed of trust authorized foreclosure upon
default, and did not require as a condition the request of the holder of the
note, the sale is held valid. The court states that the trustee was, as to third
persons, the agent both of the mortgagor and mortgagee, and that if he acted
6. 350 Mo. 1197, 1203, 171 S. W. (2d) 635, 637 (1943).
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within the authority conferred by the deed of trust, a bona fide purchaser
is protected.
Some of the reasoning of the opinion may be questioned. For example,
the trustee is not the agent of either mortgagor or mortgagee. But the court's
conclusion, that third parties should be protected if the trustee acts within
the powers conferred upon him by the trust instrument, seems sound.
In Forsterv. Clark7 the issue is one as to the delivery of a deed from
W. H. Clark and Sarah J. Clark, his wife, to their son, Lee Clark. The only
testimony as to the circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed was
given by Sarah J. Clark. She testified that after the deed was executed, her
husband handed it to her and told her to take care of it, to put it away and
not to say anything about it, and, after his death, to give it to Lee. In the
presence of her husband, she put the deed in an unlocked trunk in their bedroom, where it remained until after her husband's death fifteen years later.
She testified, without objection, that her understanding was that her husband could recall the deed at any time. After the death of W. H. Clark,
Mrs. Clark delivered the deed to Lee Clark, who, up to that time, had no
knowledge that the deed had been executed. Lee Clark had occupied the
land for several years before the execution of the deed and continued to do
so until his father's death. He regularly paid part of the income from the
land to his father. Taxes were assessed to and paid by W. H. Clark. SQil
conservation payments were made to W. H. Clark. Shortly prior to his
death, W. H. Clark sold some of the growing timber on the land, and executed a deed conveying the timber.
The court sustains the attack on the deed, holding that there had been
no delivery. The court seems to consider delivery as a question of the
grantor's intention. It states that the facts and circumstances indicated
that Clark did not intend to part with dominion over the deed nor intend
that it take effect as a present transfer.
The case raises some fundamental issues. Is delivery a question of the
grantor's intention? Is the understanding of the person to whom the deed
was entrusted material? What is the bearing of the circumstances that after
the deed was executed the grantor dealt with the land as his own?
The concept of delivery has undergone considerable transformation.
Originally the delivery of a deed was regarded as a symbolical transfer of
7. 351 Mo: 59, 171 S. W. (2d) 647 (1943).
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the land itself, analogous to livery of seisin. A physical transfer of the deed
from hand to hand was a necessary element of the process. Today many
courts and writers say that delivery is a question of intention; and that a
manual transfer of the instrument is not only not necessary, but is wholly
without significance except as evidence of the grantorrs intention to make
the instrument legally operative. The outmoded requirement of manual
transfer is derided as primitive formalism.
It is submitted that the proponents of this theory confuse two different
types of intention. In order for the deed to be valid as such, it must be
signed by the grantor with the intention that it be his deed. This is actual,
subjective intention, analogous to testamentory intent in the law of wills.
But the execution of the deed with the intention that it operate as such is not
enough to effect the transfer of the land. The law, perhaps as an outgrowth
of ancient doctrines, or because it takes cognizance of the difficulties of proof
and of the possibilities of perjured testimony, requires certain formalities.
A delivery of the instrument, outwardly manifested, is made requisite to
the transfer of title. Delivery is something wholly separate and apart from
the grantor's intention to effect a conveyance. It involves putting the instrument beyond the grantor's control. If the grantor intended to place
the deed beyond his control, but did not do so, there was no delivery.
If this analysis be sound, the court was in error in regarding delivery as
a question of intention.
Mrs. Clark's testimony as to her understanding of the transaction was
of course objectionable. However, any evidence to the effect that she held
the deed subject to her husband's orders would have been very material on
the issue of delivery. If he gave her the deed under instructions which required her to relinquish it to him upon demand, then he had not placed
the instrument beyond his control.
The fact that the grantor, after the execution of the deed, dealt with
the land as his own, has no bearing on the question of delivery. If he made
a valid conveyance, -his dealings were with his son's lands, not his own. However, such dealings are material on the issue as to whether the grantor executed the instrument with the necessary intention to convey.
In White v. Whitaker" a mother brought suit to cancel a deed of gift
which she had *executed and delivered to her daughter. The court gives the
8. 171 S. W. (2d) 684 (1943).
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relief prayed, since the evidence seemed to establish that the mother, when
seh signed the deed, believed she was signing a will. The daughter, who
handled her mother's business affairs, prepared the deed and presented it to
her mother for execution, in accordance with the daughter's understanding
of her mother's wishes in the matter. The court states that the grantor's intention was controlling, and that the understanding of the grantee was immaterial.
The decision is sound. If the mother thought she was executing a will,
she did not intend the instrument as a deed. This necessary subjective intention being absent, the instrument was ineffective, regardless of the grantee's intention or understanding, and, incidentally, regardless of delivery.
The court talks about legal fraud. It states that the daughter occupied
a fiduciary relationship, and should have explained to her mother the nature
of the instrument, and that as a consequence the daughter was guilty of
legal, if not actual, fraud. This language is unfortunate. The court's action
should have been based solely upon the fact that the mother did not intend
the instrument to be a deed.
Colem4n v. Triueblood9 is a suit to enjoin the threatened foreclosure of
a deed of trust, and to discharge the lien of the deed of trust, on the ground
that the note thereby secured is barred by the statute of limitations. The
note and deed of trust were executed in 1923, and the note matured in 1928.
The mortgagor sold the real estate in 1924, and thereafter made no payments
on the indebtedness. The land was again conveyed in 1925. Neither purchaser agreed to pay the mortgage debt. In 1928, however, the second purchaser entered into an extension agreement with the holder of the deed of
trust, and by the terms of the agreement obligated himself to pay the indebtedness on March 1, 1933, and paid interest on the note as late as 1934.
The property was again conveyed, in 1934, to the present owner, who did
not assume or agree to pay the mortgage debt, but who made payments
thereon. Foreclosure proceedings were begun in 1939. The relief prayed for
is denied. The court's position is that payments made by the various owners
who were not personally liable on the debt did not stop the running of the
statute of limitations, since these indivduals were mere volunteers; but that
since the grantee who entered into the extension agreement obligated himself on the debt, and made payments thereon as late as 1934, such payments
tolled the statute.
9. 172 S. W. (2d) 863 (1943).
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The extension agreement simplifies the case and makes the result obvious. If there had been no such agreement, the court, as the opinion indicates, would have enoined foreclosure and cancelled the lien of the deed of
trust, notwithstanding the payments made on the note within the statutory
period.
There seems to be no logical escape from the reasoning of the court on
this latter point. However, the result, in a particular case, may be very
unfortunate. The difficulty is occasioned by Revised Statutes of Missouri,
Section 1017, which bars foreclosure of a mortgage or deed of trust securing
a note upon which the statute of limitations has run. The mortgagee's only
protection is to foreclose within the statutory period after maturity unless
the landowner obligates himself to pay the debt. The natural inclination of
the mortgagee, however, would be to accept periodic payments on the debt
from the present owner.
Special problems arise in connection with amortized mortgage loans,
payable in installments over a long period. If the maturity of the indebtedness is accelerated, pursuant to provisions in the note and mortgage authorizing the mortgagee, upon the mortgagor's default, to declare the entire
indebtedness to be due and payable, and a purchaser who does not assume
and agree to pay the debt is then permitted to pay the loan in installments
according to its original terms, a question may ultimately arise as to whether
the mortgagee's right to enforce the mortgage lien has been lost by limitations. The doctrine of waiver of acceleration may, however, be involved in
such cases. By unilateral waiver, or by express or implied agreement of the
parties, the loan may have been reinstated to its original terms, with the
result that the debt did not mature, and the statute never began to run.
Lossing v. Sheudl 0 involves title to certain accreted lands on the banks
of the-Mississippi River. Plaintiff acquired title to the river bank by adverse possession, and the lands in question were built up during the running
of the statutory period. Defendant contends that plaintiff's possession never
extended down to the water's edge; that plaintiff therefore never was in
possession of the accretions; and that in any event plaintiff was not in possession of the accreted lands for the full period of the statute. The court
awards the lands to plaintiff; but the exact basis of the decision is not clear.
The court seems to conclude from the evidence that plaintiff was in adverse
possession, for the statutory period, not only of the lands actually occupied
10. 351 Mo. 188, 173 S. W. (2d) 1 (1943).
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and in cultivation on the high bank of the river, but also of the intervening
lands down to the water's edge; but apparently the court would have held
for plaintiff even though plaintiff's possession never extended to the accreted
lands, on the theory that at the outset plaintiff was in possession down to
the water's edge, and that title to the accretions follows title to the mainland.
As a practical matter, at least, the result seems proper. Whether there
are theoretical or logical difficulties may be debatable. At first blush
one is startled by the proposition that adverse possession of tract A can
carry with it title to tract B. If the high bank of the stream had been deeded
to plaintiff at the end of the statutory period, the deed would not have
conveyed the land previously accreted. If the land had been deeded at the
beginning of the period, the deed covering the land to the water's edge, then
title to the lands as they accreted would have vested in plaintiff. Does title
acquired by adverse possession relate back to the beginning of the statutory
period?
The case raises a very interesting question as to the nature of possession. The court states that the land between the high bank and the stream
was not subject to the same type of use and occupancy as the tillable land
on the bank; and that the nature of possession varies with the nature and
location of the property and the uses to which the property can be put. The
court's opinion leads one to believe that if the property can be put to no use,
one can be in adverse possession without utilizing the property and that
if the premises cannot be occupied, occupation is not an essential element
of adverse possession. Presumably, therefore, one can be in adverse possession, to its innermost recesses, of an impenetrable swamp. If so, "possession" is a misnomer.
The essential requirement is that visible and notorious acts of ownership
must be exercised over the premises. Sometimes they can be exercised only
from without the premises, when the so-called adverse possessor is not in
possession at all.
Atchison v. Weakley 1' holds that unendorsed registered United States
government bonds may be the subject of a valid gift. The court states that
title passes to the donee, despite the possibility that the treasury department
may refuse to transfer the bonds on the records of the government. The
court distinguishes cases refusing to sustain gifts of bonds which, by the
terms of the statutes authorizing them, are not transferable.
11. 350 Mo. 1092, 169 S. W. (2d) 914 (1943).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1944

37

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 4 [1944], Art. 1

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 9

Presumably the legislature may validly prescribe that property may. be
transferred only in a certain specified manner. The question is whether congress has made such a pronouncement in this case. The court thinks not,
and the decision seems correct.
The case suggests the inquiry as to the extent to which congress may
legislate with respect to rules of property. Such a question has arisen in connection with stock in corporations organized under acts of congress. May
a statute creating a federal corporation so regulate the transfer of the corporate stock as to prevent transfer of title to the stock, under ordinary rules
of law, on the death or bankruptcy of the owner? May congress properly
provide that stock in a federal lending corporation shall pass with a transfer
of the real estate mortgaged to secure a.loan in connection with which the
stock was acquired, even though the parties do not purport or intend to
transfer the stock?
Such questions may be distinguishable from the one involved here. Perhaps the United States can impose any condition it pleases on the enforceability and transferability of its own obligations.
12
The case should be considered in connection with Riss & Co. v. Wallace,'
involving the interpretation of Revised Statutes of Missouri 1939, Section
8382, which requires the transfer of a certificate of title on the sale of an
automobile, and states that the purported sale shall be fraudulent and void
if the certificate is not transferred. The action is one in replevin for the
recovery of an automobile. The defendant pleads that he purchased the car
from plaintiff, but obtained no certificate of title. The court holds this alleged
circumstance to give rise to no defense. The court states that neither title
nor right to possession of the car passes to the purchaser unless the title
certificate is transferred as provided by the statute.
The Missouri courts have been inclined to say that if the title certificate
is not transferred, the situation is the same as though no sale or contract of
sale had been entered into, and therefore the purported transfer vests no
legal or equitable rights in the purchaser. It has even been held that the"
purchaser does not acquire an insurable interest in the automobile. The
soundness of this general proposition seems open to serious question. Doubtless the sales contract cannot be enforced between the parties if the statute
is not complied with. The purchaser should not be able to bring replevin
against the seller, or to defend against a replevin suit by the seller. But as
12. 350 Mo. 1208, 171 S. V. (2d) 641 (1943).
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against third persons, the purchaser's rights surely are not the same as though
no sale occurred. Rankin v. Wyatt"3 is perhaps indicative of a more liberal
trend in the interpretation of the act. It sustains a replevin suit against a
stranger, brought by a purchaser who acquired no title certificate.

TAXATION
PAUL

G.

OCHTERBECK*

The cases on' taxation decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri during
the year 1943 did not produce any radical changes in the established
precedents. The court did, however, indicate that the right of municipal
corporations to levy taxes was going to be limited strictly to the terms of the
grant of authority.' The cases have been divided on a topical basis and the
principles announced are discussed in as brief a space as possible.

I.

INHERITANCE TAXES

A. Trustee's Commissons as a Deduction
In the case of In re McKinney's Estate,2 the supreme court held that
trustee's commissions should be considered as a deduction in arriving at the
sum to be taxed. Outside the state of Missouri there is a split of authority
as to whether trustees commissions should be considered as a deduction in
computing inheritance taxes.3 Inasmuch as our inheritance tax is a tax on
the right to receive property, the supreme court's decision is sound, fair and
just.
B. Taxation of Remainders
In the case of In re Estate of Shaw v. Hamilton,4 the Supreme Court
of Missouri held under Section 597 of Missouri Revised Statutes (1939) that
remainders subject to contingencies should. be taxed to the person which
under the provisions of the will will yield the highest possible tax. The
legislature in 1943 amended Section 597 so that in the future the state will
collect inheritance taxes at the lowest rate and so that if a contingency occurs
13.
1.
2.
3.
4.

335 Mo. 628, 73 S. W. (2d) 764 (1934).
See II C, infra.
351 Mo. 718, 173 S. W. (2d) 898 -(1943).
Note (1934), 92 A. L. R. 537, 538.
351 Mo. 1151, 175 S. W. (2d) 588 (1943).
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requiring a higher rate of tax, the trustee will be required to pay the higher
rate before distribution is made.5
II. TAxEs LEVIED BY MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
A. Occupation Tax on Public Movers
In the case of Ex parte William Lockhardt,6 the Supreme Court of Missouri en bane held that pursuant to the provisions of Section 8395 of Missouri Revised Statutes (1939) the city of St. Louis had the right to levy an
occupation tax on public movers of uncrated household goods.
B. Use and Storage Taxes
In the case of Kansas City v. Frogge'7 the supreme court en bano held

that the city of Kansas City had no authority to impose a use and storage
tax which was enacted as a complement to the state sales tax.
C. Rigkt of Municipal Corporations to Levy Taxes
In the case of KKansas City v. Frogge, supra, the court held: (1) that

the power to levy taxes is inherent in the legislature independent of any constitutional grant and is absolute and uncontrolled except as limited in the
constitution; (2) that a municipal corporation has no inherent power of taxation and consequently possesses only such power as has been granted to it
by the legislature under statutes or by the people under its charter subject
to constitutional limitations; (3) that the right of a municipal corporation
to levy taxes is an extraordinary one that should never be left to implication
unless it be a necessary implication; and (4) that the grant relied upon must
be evident and unmistakable and all doubts resolved against its exercise.
The court in this case overruled the basis of State ex rel. People's Motor Bits
Co. v. Blaine and in effect held that there could be no general grant of authority to a municipal corporation in its charter to levy any and all kinds
of taxes. The court en banc in the case of Ex parte William Lockhardt, supra,
was careful to point to the statutory authority in sustaining the tax in
question.
5.
die after
6.
7.
8.

Missouri Laws (1943) 307-309 (Effective only as to decedents who
November 22, 1943).
350 Mo. 1220, 171 S. W. (2d) 660 (1943).
176 S. W. (2d) 498 (Mo. 1943).
332 Mo. 582, 58 S. W. (2d) 975 (1933).
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III. INCOME TAXES

A. Assessment
In the case of State v. Rogers,9 division two of the supreme court held
that the state auditor's estimate must be certified to the county assessor
within three years after the income tax was due, before the county assessor
has authority to assess an additional income tax or an income tax when the
taxpayer failed to file a return.
B. Exemptions
In the case of In the Matter of First National Safe Deposit Company,"'
the court en banc, held that the right of a corporation to a tax exemption
is to be determined by the powers given in its charter and not by the method
which it operates, conducts its business, or distributes its income. In reaching
this result the court followed the decision in the case of Murphy v. Concordia
Publishing House' and the federal cases decided under the federal income
tax law.
IV.

PERSONAL PROPERTY TAXES

A. Collection
In Hamnmett v. Kansas City,' 2 division one of the supreme court held
that the city of Kansas City had the power and authority to pass an ordinance to compel the payment of personal property taxes and merchant's taxes
as a condition precedent to obtaining a motor vehicle license. The ordinance
is interesting in that it follows the popular belief that the great mass of
people will pay or do mostly anything to keep their automobiles in use.
B. Assessment
3 division one of the supreme court held
In State ex rel. Lane v. Corneli,1
that an additional assessment of personal property taxes against the executors of an estate was void because service of notice upon the executors did
not appear of record. The service of notice was held jurisdictional. Language
in a former opinion relating to this same assessment was modified. 4

9. 351 Mo. 231, 172 S. W. (2d) 940 (1943).
10. 351 Mo. 423, 173 S. W. (2d) 403 (1943).
.11. 348 Mo. 753, 155 S. W. (2d) 122 (1941), 136 A. L. R. 1461, 1467 (1942)
(1941 Unemployment Compensation Taxes).
12. 351 Mo. 192, 173 S. W. (2d) 70 (1943).
13. 351 Mo.1,171 S.W. (2d) 687 (1943).
14. See 347 Mo. 932, 149 S. W. (2d) 815 (1941).
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C. Avoidance v. Evasion
In State ex rel. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Hoekn,",the court en bane
held that where a taxpayer on May 26, 1941, withdrew $378,000 and invested same in tax exempt United States Treasury Bills maturing June 4,
1941, the taxpayer was legally avoiding personal property taxes and was not
guilty of evasion; and that the assessment of $378,000 as omitted property
as shown on the records of the State Board of Equalization and the State
Tax Commission should be quashed.
D. Taxation of Executors and Administrators
In State ex rel. Waite v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank,1 0 division one of the
court held that the situs of personal property of an estate for the purpose of
taxation by the city of Webster Groves was in the city of Webster Groves,
the residence of the deceased, even though the property was held in the city
of St. Louis by an executor domiciled in the city of St. Louis.
V.

SPECIAL BENEFIT TAXES AND SPECIAL TAX BILLS
of St. Louis v. FranklinBank,17 the court en banc held

In City
that the
provisions of the St. Louis Charter relating to condemnation proceedings
and assessment 6f special benefits are not unconstitu*tional as an invalid
delegation of legislative power and that the procedure ordinarily followed
by the city of St. Louis in assessing special benefits was not subject to attack
by a writ of "coram nobis."
In Ruckels v. Pryor,18 division one of the court held that a class action
to cancel special tax bills because of a conspiracy to evade competitive bidding could be maintained and prosecuted to a successful conclusion even
though the special tax bills of the original plaintiff were paid prior to time
the other plaintiffs were made parties and adopted the allegations of the
petition. The court cut through many legal technicalities in order to reach
a just result-this decision should have a salutary effect upon contractors.
VI. PROCEEDINGS TO SET ASIDE OR ENJOIN ASSESSMENTS

A. Void Assessments
In State v.
division two of the supreme court held that where
the assessment is illegal and void, there is no necessity to follow or exhaust
Rogers,'9

15. 351 Mo. 382, 173 S. W. (2d) 393 (1943).
16. 351 Mo. 1234, 175 S. W. (2d) 795 (1943).

17. 351 Mo. 688, 173 S. W. (2d) 837 (1943).
18. 351 Mo. 819, 174 S. W. (2d) 185 (1943).
19. 351 Mo. 819, 174 S. W. (2d) 185 (1943).
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the statutory administrative remedies and that the void assessment can be
attacked collaterally at any stage of the proceedings to enforce it. In State
ex rel. Lane v. Coreli,2' division one held that certiorariwas the proper
remedy to test the sufficiency of the records. A careful reading of the first
decision in this case 2' discloses how dangerous it is to rely on this remedynot even conceded facts can be considered unless they appear in the records
brought before the court. However, where the taxpayer is merely trying to
avoid part of an assessment for fraud or excessiveness he must exhaust his
22
statutory administrative remedies.
B. Double Taxation
23
Division two of the supreme court in the case of Quick v." Goodloe,
held that a taxpayer asserting that his property was being subjected to
double taxation by two sewer districts had the burden of proving that his
property had been included in both sewer districts.

VII. TAx SALEs AND TITLES
During the year 1943, the supreme court rendered four more decisions
holding that the considerations paid at the tax sales in question were so
grossly inadequate and unconscionable as to amount to fraud and decided
that the sales should be set aside.2 4 In Johnson v. McAboy, 25 a consideration
of $79.05 paid for forty acres of land worth between $1,000 and $2,000 was
held so grossly inadequate as of itself to amount to fraud. In Rudd v. Scott,28
a consideration of $12.50 for property worth $600 was also held so inadequate
as to amount to fraud. In Heagerty v. Hawkins,21 a consideration of $10
paid for property worth $600 or $700 was held so inadequate as to require
cancellation of the collector's deed. In Swain v. Boeving,28 a decree cancelling
a tax deed on the ground that a consideration of $84.21 paid for land worth
$2000 was so grossly inadequate as to amount to fraud was affirmed.
20. 351 Mo. 1,171 S.W. (2d) 687 (1943).
21. 347 Mo. 932, 149 S. W. (2d) 815 (1941).
22. State v. Rogers, supra. See also the clear and instructive opinion by Judge
Ellison in the case of State ex rel. Merritt v. Gardner, 347 Mo. 569, 148 S. W. (2d)
780 (1941).
23. 171 S. W. (2d) 615 (Mo. 1943).
24. See (1943) 8 Mo. L. REv. 282, 288 for four similar decisions rendered
during 1942.
25. 350 Mo. 1086, 169 S. W. (2d) 932 (1943).
26. 351 Mo. 1206, 175 S. W. (2d) 774 (1943).
27. 173 S. W. (2d) 923 (Mo. 1943).
28. 175 S. W. (2d) 591 (Mo. 1943).
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In BvIlock v. Peoples Bank of Holcomb,2 the court held that failure
of the grantee in a tax deed to record the deed within four years from the
date of the tax sale as required by statute caused the grantee's lien or title
rights to expire.
In State ex rel. Crites v. Short,30 the court held that a grantee who
acquired title to realty by quit claim deed which was executed by an attorney in fact exercising a power under unacknowledged power of attorney had
"... an interest in the land . . ." sufficient to be entitled to redeem the land
from a sale held pursuant to the provisions of the Jones-Munger Act.3 1 The
deed was held valid between the parties notwithstanding the fact that the
power of attorney was not acknowledged as required by Section 3433 of the
Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1939.
VIII. EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION

BY

SPECIAL CHARTER

In the case of Trustees of William Jewell College v. Beavers,32 the supreme court en banc held that the special acts of the legislature chartering
the college and exempting' its property from taxation were required to be
construed together and that when they were accepted and acted upon they
constituted a contract protected by Section 10 of Article I of the Constitution of the United States. This case is interesting in that it reviews the
other cases decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri involving the tax
exemptions of both Washington University and William Jewell College.

IX.

GENERAL RULES OF CONSTRUCTION

A. Strict Construction
The right of a taxing authority to levy a particular tax must be clearly
authorized by statute and such statutes are to be strictly construed against
the taxing authority.3 3 However, exemptions contained in a taxing statute
are construed strictly and most strongly against the taxpayer and the exemp3 4
tion must be clearly required by the terms of the statute.
29. 351 Mo. 587, 173 S. W. (2d) 753 (1943).
30. 351 Mo. 1013, 1014, 174 S. W. (2d) 821 (1943).
31. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 11145.
32. 351 Mo. 87, 171 S. W (2d) 604 (1943).
33. State v. Rogers, 351 Mo. 321, 172 S. W. (2d) 940 (1943); In the Matter
of First National Safe Deposit Co., 351 Mo. 423, 173 S. W. (2d) 403 (1943).
34. In the Matter of First National Safe Deposit Co., 351 Mo. 423, 173 S. W.
(2d) 403 (1943).
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B. Ej'usdem Generis
The rule of ejusdem generis was applied in the case of HIammett v. Kansas City3" to prevent a conflict between the provisions of two statutes.
C. "'Or " Construed to Mean "'AnXd' "
'
was construed to mean
In the case of Ex parte Lockhart,36 "'or
"'and'" to carry out the plain purpose of the act and to avoid defeating

the purpose of the act.

TORTS
GLENN

A.

MCCLEARY

'

The volume of work presented to. the court in the field of Torts repreresented as usual a good proportion of the cases appealed. There was a
total of forty-five cases involving tort principles decided in this period, not
incliding the cases under the humanitarian rule which are considered separately in this sfirvey of the court's work. In this number, however, only
well settled doctrines were applied to factual situations which varied slightly
from situations previously before the court.
I.

NEGLIGENCE

A. Duties of persons in certain relations
1. Possessors of land
The situation of injuries received by the defendants' housekeeper from
slipping and falling on a waxed floor in a private home was presented in
Lawson v. Higgins.1 The court recognized that the petition alleged ". . . in
substance . ..that defendants negligently used waxes and other slippery
substances in uneven and excessive quantities and excessively polished the
same by using cloths and other polishing devices." Apparently the pleader
was attempting to bring his case within the dictum of an earlier decision
when
holding that it was not negligence merely to wax an office floor "...
35. 351 Mo. 192, 173 S.W. (2d) 70 (1943).
36. 350 Mo. 1220, 171 S. W. (2d) 660 (1943).
*Professor of Law and Dean of the Law School, University of Missouri. A.B.,
Ohio Wesleyan University, 1917; J.D., University of Michigan, 1924; S.J.D., Harvard, 1936.
1. 350 Mo. 1066, 1069, 169 S.W. (2d) 881, 882 (Mo. 1943).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1944

45

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 4 [1944], Art. 1

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9

no unusual amount or kind of wax is used as to make it slicker than waxed
floors of like character are usually kept."2 The court sustained the demurrer
to the petition on the ground there was no allegation that the defendants
knew they were using excessive waxing substances or were excessively polishing the substances. But a housekeeper is an invitee and is owed a duty by
the possessor, as to conditions of danger of which he knew or could have
discovered by reasonable care, to warn or make reasonably safe the condition which, if known to him, he should realize as involving an unreasonable
risk to the business visitors. The opinion indicates further the same limited duty by reasoning, since the plaintiff who had been the housekeeper
for a period of time prior to the injury did not know of the dangerous condition, it could not be consistently alleged that the defendants had such
knowledge. The petition may have been faulty in other respects but this
reason given in the opinion would be hardly sufficient. If knowledge must be
shown in a waxed floor case before a duty is owed to a business visitor then
there is a different basis of liability from the many other situaiions in which
injuries have resulted to invitees.
Confusion caused in some of the Kansas City Court of Appeals decisions,
by following the blackletter Section of the Restatement' as to the liability
of a lessor for repairs gratuitously done, was eliminated in Bartlett v. Taylor.4 The Restatement makes the lessor liable, in purporting to make repairs thereofh while the land is in the possession of the lessee, only where his
negligence in making the repairs makes the land more dangerous for use
and the tenant neither knows nor should know of the increased danger. The
court in the instant case holds that the responsibility is broader and holds
that the lessor, while under no obligation to make repairs where the condition
came into existence after the tenant had come into full possession of the
premises, must exercise reasonable rare in gratuitously making repairs. This
does not seem too severe because the lessor did not have to make the repairs in the first place and the fact of making the repairs gives some implied
assurance that his repairing will be properly done and the previous defective
condition will be remedied. Here a quarter-inch steel cable used in the me2. Ilgenfritz v. Missouri Power & Light Co., 340 Mo. 648, 101 S. W. (2d)
723 (1937), noted in (1937) 2 Mo. L. REv. 374. Another case involving a wax
'floor in a place of business is State ex rel. Golloday v. Shain, 341 Mo. 889, 110
S. W. (2d) 719 (1937), quashing the opinion by the Kansas City Court of Appeals in Myers v. Golloday, 104 S. W. (2d) 1007 (Mo. App. 1936).
3. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 362.
4. 351 Mo.1060, 174 S.W. (2d) 844 (1943).
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chanical device for raising and lowering a garage door had been replaced
by an insulated electric wire. About one month later the wire broke causing
the thousand pound door to fall upon the plaintiff.
The language used in the blackletter of the Restatement is unfortunate
in describing the lessor's liability in this type of situation, as it seems to
require the tenant to show that the repairs "made the .land more dangerous
for use." But in the comment to this Section a broader liability is shown
to have been intended when it is stated that ". . . this Section applies if the
negligent manner in which the repairs are made makes the land more dangerous for use, irrespective of whether the added danger is due to the fact
that the physical condition of land is changed for the worse by the repairs
or to the fact that the making of the repairs gives it a deceptive appearance
of safety and so leads the tenant or others with his consent to use the land
in a way which but for the repairs they would recognize to be dangerous."
The cases cited in the commentary to the tentative draft of this Section show
further that the broader liability was intended. In most any situation repairs give a deceptive appearance of safety, hence would seem that the statement of the principle of liability by the court in the instant case expresses
the same idea as to the lessor's liability as intended by the Restatement, but
rather unfortunately expressed in the blackletter. It is quite understandable,
however, why the intermediate appellate court was misled in its reliance. 5
Where an owner of a building leases the entire building to a tenant who
sublets to others, his liability as to existing dangers to his lessee and those
on the premises in the right of the lessee is limited to defects or dangerous
conditions of which he has knowledge and which were not apparent to the
lessee. If the defect is one which the lessee may be presumed to discover by
an ordinary inspection, any duty to warn others who come on the premises
in the right of the lessee is owed by the lessee and not by the lessor. In
Burton v. Rothschild,' the plaintiff, a sub-tenant of an apartment, fell on
a stairway caused by tread of the first step's being but 434 inches whereas
the treads of the other steps were of a uniform depth of 74 inches. On
demurrer to the petition the defect in the steps was held to have been open

5. The holding of the court as to the tenant's knowledge of the physical facts
and of the appreciation of the danger under the facts of the case throws considerable
light on the tenant's protection in cases of this nature.
6. 351 Mo. 562, 173 S. W. (2d) 681 (1943). The court further held that the
plaintiff was an invitee of the lessee. But this gave her no better position as against
the lessor in the head lease than her landlord would have had.
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and obvious to the lessee; therefore, the lessor in the head lease owed no
duty to anyone who might come on the premises as an invitee of the lessee.
The court distinguishes this case, where the entire premises were leased,
from cases where the lessor has retained possession of a common stairway,
and from the cases where, although the lease is for the entire premises and
the defect is one which should have been discovered by the lessee, the premises are leased for us as a public or semi-public place to which the public
generally is invited as patrons of the lessee and where the lessor has reason
to believe that the lessee may not make safe 'the existing dangerous condition
7
before the public enters.
The liability of an agent or manager of an elevator for injuries suffered
by a business visitor resulting from conditions of disrepair was involved in
Giles v. MoundridgeMilling Co. 8 Where the agent has the complete control
of a possessor over the premises his liability is the same as that of a possessor.
But where his control is limited, the injuries must result from conditions

over which he did have control and for which he was responsible. Whether
the injuries which were sustained when a business visitor fell after he had
attempted, with the aid of a bar laid in upright posts across an elevator
7. The automobile cases decided in this period contribute little to the case law
of the state. A rather helpful decision on what a sole cause instruction must include
for a complete hypothesization of the facts is found in Semar v. Kelly, Mo. 176
S. W. (2d) 289 (Mo. 1943). An instruction in Jungeblut v. Maris, 351 Mo. 301,
305, 172 S. W. (2d) 861, 862, 863 (1943), defining the "highest degree of care,"
within the meaning of the statute defining the care which an operator of an automobile must exercise, as "'. .-. that degree of care, human skill and foresight, which
a reasonably careful and prudent person would ordinarily and customarily exercise
under the same, 'or similar, circumstances; ....
" was clearly erroneous as defining
ordinary care only. The court continues to define "highest degree of care" as "1...
that degree of care that a-very careful and prudent person would ordinarily exercise
under the same or similar circumstances.'" In Bush v. Kansas City Public Service
Co., 350 Mo. 876, 169 S. W. (2d) 331 (1943), where a bus in a private driveway
was standing at the public street line, the operator intending to drive the bus upon
the street was bound to exercise the highest degree of care under the statute to
discover traffic upon the street before proceeding thereon. The appellant had contended that the bus was still being operated upon a private roadway and in such
cases only ordinary care was required. The court points out that to accept such
contention would place a strained construction on the statute requiring the exercise
of the highest degree of care in operating a motor vehicle on the highways of the
state. The Arkansas guest statute denying liability "'...enless such, injury shall
have been caused by the willful inisconduct of such owner or operator'" was held
not applicable in Autry v. Sanders, 350 Mo. 1131, 1133, 169 S. W. (2d) 944 (1943),
where in turning across the center line of the highway to pass a truck at night under
rainy, foggy weather conditions the defendant drove into the path of an approaching
truck properly lighted. The court held that the evidence did not disclose that the
defendant was conscious of the approach of the truck and did not turn his car
across the center line of the highway into its path, knowing it was there.
8. 351 Mo. 568, 173 S.W. (2d) 745 (1943).
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shaft, to regain his balance on a runway on a nearby floor, the bar giving
way due to disrepair, the manager having directed the visitor to the vicinity
of the elevator, resulted from a breach of duty by the manager to repair or
to warn were for the jury.
2. Railroads
Just when sufficient evidence has been produced to make a submissible
case on whether a railroad crossing is extraordinarily hazardous, - so as to
raise a duty on the part of the railroad company to adopt special protective
measures, is often a close question. The court in other cases has held it to
be for the jury where the crossing is extraordinarily hazardous because of
the congestion or speed of railroad or highway traffic, or where the view and
hearing of the highway traveler are seriously interferred with by intervening
objects and the crossing is much used. In Borrson v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas
R. R.,9 the crossing was in a rural section; the sight and sound were clear
on the east and west on the south side and toward the east on the north
side, but on the north side (the side from which the truck approached) it
was difficult to hear or see a train approaching from the west until it was
close; the traffic was shown to have trebled since 1927; the particular road

was the principal highway from the neighborhood to the county seat; there
were a country school house and some ten families scattered throughout; a

number of farmers residing in the upland went over that crossing to rented
tracts in the Missouri river bottom; three school busses and a rural mail
carrier used it daily; some fifty men were cutting willows in the river bottom

south of the crossing; the employees at two WPA rock quarries in the vicinity
and their rock trucks passed over the crossing in going to and returning
from work. These facts were considered sufficient to take the case to the

jury on this issue.
In Thrower v. Henwood,"° the plaintiff received injuries when he attempted to climb through defendant's train as it stood at a crossing, the
train starting to move as he was still in the act. In an action based upon the
Arkansas lookout statute, the court held that the statute applied only to
persons, including trespassers, upon or near the track but did not apply to a
9. 351 Mo. 214, 220, 172 S. W. (2d) 826, 829 (1943). On the issue of sole
negligence it was also contended that the plaintiff's death was not due to the failure
to sound the crossing signals, because the train was in plain view for a sufficient
length of time to permit the father to stop the truck, and therefore the death was
due to the intervening negligence of the parent The answer by the court was:
"But who can say he would no thave done so if these warning signals had been
sounded?"
10. 351 Mo. 663, 173 S. W. (2d) 861 (1943).
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person who had boarded a train to climb through to the other side at a crossing, the statute in express terms requiring a lookout for persons "upon the
track." This on its face, held the court, implies persons external to the train.
There was no Arkansas decision on the question. The court also rested its
decision on the fact that while he was mounting or going between the cars
he was so hidden from the view of the members of the train crew that a
practicable lookout could not be kept.
An interesting application of the Safety Appliance Act was made in
Crabtree v. Kurn," in an action predicated on the Act for the death of a
brakeman who was killed in making a "flying switch." Although there was
no imperfection in the appliances, this particular operation required that the
brakeman go between the cars for the purpose of uncoupling the cars. This
was held to constitute a violation of the Act which provides: "It shall be
unlawful for any common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad
to haul or permit to be hauled or used on its line any car used in moving
interstate traffic not equipped with couplers coupling automatically by im-

pact, and which can be uncoupled without the necessity of men going between
the ends of cars." The plaintiff did not contend that the railroad Was negligent in any manner, nor that there was a mechanical defect in the uncoupling
devices, nor that the uncoupling devices failed to function or operate for any
cause, nor that the railroad failed to equip its cars with appliances not complying with the standards filed by the rules and orders of the Interstate

Commerce Commission. It was the movement itself which to execute made
it necessary for the brakeman to go between cars and such conduct consti12
tuted a violation of the standards fixed by the Act.

3. Municipal Corporations
A municipality, engaged in furnishing public utility services, such as
water supply, in its private corporate capacity was held in Lockhart v. Kan11. 351 Mo. 628, 173 S. W. (2d) 851 (1943).
12. Other cases involving the liability of railroads for personal injuries turned
on the sufficiency of the evidence in the particular case which cannot be reviewed
here: Johnson v. Southern Ry., 351 Mo. 1110, 175 S. W. (2d) 802 (1943); Borrson
v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. R., 351 Mo. 214, 172 S. W. (2d) 835 (1943); Lloyd
v. Alton R. R., 351 Mo. 1156, 175 S. W. (2d) 819 (1943); Goslin v. Kurn, 351 Mo.
395, 173 S. W. (2d) 79 (1943) (whether railroad furnished a reasonably safe place
to work where ruts existed in street at a point where a brakeman was obliged to
board a moving car in the performance of his duties). In Jurgens v. Thompson,
169 S. W. (2d) 353 (Mo. 1943), a sole cause instruction was held to be in proper
form although it stated defendant's negligence, abstractly since plaintiff had
hypothesized those facts. The court held the defendant need not negative all those
facts in its instruction. Neither was there any incorporation by reference.
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sas City" to b subject to the Occupational Disease Act which prescribes
standards of care for employees engaged in dangerous processes specified
therein. Here the plaintiff worked as a janitor in the chemical building of
the defendant's water purification plant and alleged that substances prepared
and used by the defendant caused deleterious and poisonous dust in the
building in which he worked so that it was inhaled by him in dangerous
quantities, causing him permanent incapacitating injuries and disease in
violation of the statute. The defendant contended that this statute did not
apply to a municipal corporation. The emphasis of the statute was on the
protection to employees and was broad enough to cover every employer of
labor in this state using such processes. The same interpretation has been
usually made in the application of employer's liability acts to a municipality's
business operations in its private corporate capacity. The fact that the title
of the act did not embrace municipal corporations did not limit the legislative intent.
In Beai v. City of 114Ioberly,' 4 in an action against the city for injuries
received from falling into an open, unguarded sewer ditch in the parkway of
a street, liability could not be predicated on the failure of the city to observe
its own ordinances which required persons making excavations in or near
streets, sidewalks or driveways to enclose them with barriers and place warning lights, the enactment and enforcement of ordinances being a governmental function.
4. Employee-employer relationship
In Womnack v. Orr,"5 and Urie v. Thompson,16 in actions against employers for damages resulting from silicosis, the court, in sustaining a demurrer to the evidence in the first case and a demurrer to the petition in
the second, states that the standard of conduct in determining negligence is
the average in the trade or business in which the defendant is engaged:
"'No one is held by the law to a higher degree of care than the average in
A man, in conducting his
the trade or business in which he is engaged ....
business in-the way that everybody else in a like business does, has measured up to the standard demanded by the law and has exercised the ordinary
care of prudent men engaged in the business.'" In the former case the ore
13.
14.
15.
16.

351
350
176
176

Mo. 1218, 175 S. W. (2d) 814 (1943).
Mo. 975, 169 S. W. (2d) 393 (1943).
S. W. (2d) 477, 482 (Mo. 1943).
S. W. (2d) 471 (Mo. 1943).
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buyers had established a regular usage in the conduct of their business for
more than fifty years. An objection was sustained to testimony as to appliances available for the protection from silica laden dust of those workers in
the better mines and mills in those particular occupations where dust accumulates. In the same case the court also quoted: "'No man is held to a
higher degree of skill than the fair average of his profession or trade, and
the standard of due care is the conduct of the average prudent man. The
test of negligence in employers is the same, and, however strongly they may
be convinced that there is a better way, .. . no jury can be permitted to say
that the usual and ordinary way commonly adopted by those in the same
business is a negligent way, for which liability shall be imposed. Juries must
necessarily determine the responsibility of individual conduct, but they cannot.be allowed to set up a standard which shall, in effect, dictate the customs
or control the business of the community."'
Although this standard was set up in earlier Missouri decisions involving
employer-employee relationships, it is just such standards that brought on
the Workmen's Compensation Acts and other legislation designed to protect
employees.1 7 It in effect permits employers to set their own standards of
conduct. The custom or practice might very well be a reasonable one, in the
abstract, and yet not one in which the ordinary reasonable man would indulge
under the circumstances of the particular case. Where the relationship is
not that of employer and employee what is customarily done in a given situation is evidence only of reasonable care, but this still permits the finder of
the fact to measure the defendant's conduct by that reasonableness. Mr.
Justice Holmes stated the principle so well: "What usually is done may be
evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a
standard of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is complied with or
not. " "' In that case the same contention had been made that the agency
causing the injury to an employee was handled in the usual and ordinary
way. It has been suggested that the general usage of others engaged in the
same business under similar circumstances as the standard by which to judge
particular conduct as negligent or not is clearly traceable to th basic rule
that the servant assumes the ordinary risks of his work, such ordinary risks
17. In the Urie case liability was found under the Boiler Inspection Act which

imposes strict liability for an injury resulting from a defective sanding machine
which caused dust to come into the cab of the engine where plaintiff worked.
18. Texas and Pacific Ry. v. Behymer, 189 U. S. 468, 470, 23 Sup. Ct. 622,

623 (1903).
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.evidently being deemed by many courts to be those usual to the employment.19 But such a rule in the employer-employee cases permits business to
determine the rule of conduct for itself as o what is the proper standard of
conduct, a surrender by the law not recognized in other relationships. There
is at least one Missouri decision which has expressly disapproved of this
standard: "The issue of negligence vel won is ruled by the applicable principles of law rather than the usual practices and customs of individual defenses." 20 There the lower court had given an instruction exacting ordinary
care on the part of the plaintiff-employee but predicated, in general terms,
non-negligence on the part of defendant upon a finding that the cut of cars
was being moved in accordance with the usual practices and customs prevailing in defendant's said yard. In disapproving this standard the court in that
instance expressly quoted the statement of Mr. Justice Holmes above. Of
course the situation is quite different and is to be distinguished from the
question of reasonable care where professional conduct is in issue and where
the jury needs such a guide. But common business practice does not present
the same difficulty for a jury in determining whether reasonable care was
21
exercised.
5. Supplier of a chattel
In Orr v. SIell Oil Co., 2 2 the plaintiff was an employee of manufacturing
chemists who had a contract with the defendant to compound, according to
the defendant's formula, insect spray sold under the defendant's name and
label. The defendant furnished the formula and specifications, chemicals and
other ingredients, cans and containers. One of the ingredients was a chemical which had to be dissolved in mixing the spray and which the defendant
knew to be dangerous to the human body from working with it. The court

19. See note on custom as standard of care (1930) 68 A. L. R. 1400.
20. Grosvener v. New York Central R. R., 343 Mo. 611, 621, 123 S. W. (2d)
173, 178 (1938), noted in Work of the Missouri Supreme Court 1938-TORTS (1939)
4 Mo. L. Rev. at 439.
21. On the question whether the relationship between the parties was that
of employer and employee or that of employer and independent contractor, see
Smith v. Fine, 351 Mo. 1179, 175 S.W. (2d) 761 (1943) (pedestrian's action for
injuries from being struck by employee's automobile while collecting for his employer on his way to his place of work), and McKay v. Delico Meat Products Co.,
351 Mo. 876, 174 S. W. (2d) 149 (1943) (where control over details of work
done by a bricklayer under a contract held to outweigh factors of selecting and
employing his own assistants, of being registered as a contractor under the Workmen's Compensation Commission, and of being listed as an employer in reporting
to the Social Security Commission).
22. 177 S.W. (2d) 608 (Mo. 1943).
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approved the rule of liability as expressed in the RESTATEMENT of TORTS2s
that one who supplies a chattel for another to use is liable to those whom
the supplier should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other,
or to be in the vicinity of its probable use, for bodily harm caused by the
use of the chattel in the manner for which, and by a person for whose use it
is supplied, if the supplier knows, or should realize, that the chattel is or is
likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and has no reason
to believe that those who may be expected to use the chattel will realize its
dangerous condition, and fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of
the dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
In this case the harm resulting from working with the chemical was Bright's
disease. The defendant knew that the chemical was to be so handled because
directions in writing were furnished for manufacturing the product under the
contractual arrangement.
B. Res ipsa loquitur

It is a necessary requirement for the application of the rule res ipsa
loquitur that, in addition to the fact of injury, the surrounding circumstances must be shown to justify the inference that the injury was caused
by the defendant's negligence. In Charlton v. Lovelace,2 4 an action for
wrongful death arising out of a motor boat accident, evidence that the employee's superior was operating the motor boat when it left the dock, that
employee was in the rear seat, that the boat was going in a forward motion
and subsequently overturned, causing the employee to drown was insufficient
to invoke the doctrine in the'absence of any evidence to indicate why the
boat turned over. There was insufficient evidence of the surrounding circumstances reasonably to exclude the possibility of the accident having been
caused by some other cause for which the defendant was in no manner
responsible.
In WiLtaker v. Pitcairn,2" the doctrine of res ipsa loqititur was held to

apply to an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for damages
sustained by the head brakeman when the locomotive on which he was riding
was derailed as a result of heavy rainfall. The fact that the injured employee
was operating or working the instrumentality causing the injury did not
23. Section 388.
24. 351 Mo. 364, 173 S. W. (2d), 13 (1943).

25. 351 Mo. 848, 174 S. W. (2d) 163 (1943), noted in (1944) 9 Mo. L. REv.
at 283.
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necessarily forbid the application of the doctrine. He had no control over
the management of the train and was in no manner responsible for the condition of the roadbed or for the inspection of the tracks after the rainfall.
The court reiterates the position taken in the later Missouri decisions that
the prima facie showing made by a plaintiff under the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine raises a substantial factual inference of the defendant's general negligence which is evidence that does not disappear on the introduction of the
defendant's exculpatory evidence but is sufficient to support an affirmative
finding.
C. Causation

-

Assuming negligence is established, before liability exists there must be
a causal relation between the negligence and the harm which has been sustained. Harm may be sustained as a consequence of the negligent conduct
because the conduct subjected the plaintiff to that particular hazard. On
the other hand harm may result in some other manner than through the exposure of the plaintiff to this hazard. The mere fact that injury follows
negligence in point of time does not necessarily create liability because the
same injury may have resulted as it did even though the defendant has not
been negligent. Before there is causal connection between the alleged negligence and the injury the facts must show that but for the negligent act the
injury would not have occurred. In Springer v. Security National Bank Savings & Trust Co.,26 the petition alleged that plaintiff sustained loss by reason
of the negligence of the defendant bank in handling plaintiff's brokerage
account by failing to sell sufficient of plaintiff's securities to wipe out the
debit balance in the plaintiff's brokerage account. While it was true that
there was a loss due to a decline in the value of the securities, there was no
showing that any part of this loss was due to the negligence of the defendant
bank to pay the debit balance. There was no allegation that any part of the
plaintiff's securities were lost to him nor that his securities or any part of
them were sold by his broker because they became insufficient to carry the
debit balance. On the contrary, the plaintiff alleged that he still owned a
considerable equity in the account. The petition did not charge a duty to
sell all or any part of the securities to protect the plaintiff from the risk
of loss due to a decline in the value of them. Assuming there was a duty to
pay the debit balance in the brokerage account, the alleged loss did not
result from this omission. The plaintiff was endeavoring to recoup his total
26.

175 S. W. (2d) 797 (Mo. 1943).
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loss due to an unfavorable market and on demurrer to the petition the court
found no causal relation in fact. Had the petition claimed damages to the
extent of the decline in market value of those' securities which may have
been sold to wipe out the debit balance, as defendant bank was under a duty
to do, it would seem that causal connection might have been established,
since but for the defendant's negligence the loss would not have occurred.
It's negligent conduct would have subjected the plaintiff to that particular
hazard in the market. Or had the petition charged a duty to sell all or any
part of the securities to protect the plaintiff from the risk of loss due to a
decline in the market, the harm may not have resulted but for the defendant's
negligence. The case is one of the very few which comes to grips with the
question of actual causation or causation in fact; in the great bulk of the
decisions causation in fact is clear under the but for analysis and the question
is one of proximate or legal cause which goes to the limits of liability-a
separate problem altogether.
D. Defenses in negligence cases
'In Hopkins v. Kurn,2 plaintiff's petition under the Oklahoma death
statute pleaded Oklahoma law, including Section 6, Article 23, of the Oklahoma Constitution which provides that "'the defense of contributory negligence or of assumption of risk shall, in all cases whatsoever, be a question
of fact, and shall, at all times, be left to the jury.'" The defense of contributory negligence was pleaded. Error was assigned for overruling defendant's
motion to strike the portion of plaintiff's petition pleading the portion of
the Oklahoma Constitution set forth above and in refusing defendant's requested instruction in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence. These questions turned on whether the provision in the Oklahoma Constitution that
the defense of contributory negligence was a question of fact which should
at all times be left to the jury constituted procedural law or substantive law.
The court held that under the interpretation by the Oklahoma courts this
constitutional provision pertained only to the procedural method of ascertaining the fact of the plaintiff's negligence and was not substantive law,
expressly overruling an earlier Springfield Court of Appeals decision in
Jackson v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railroad Co. 2 8 involving the same question. Therefore, the law of the forum controls. This conclusion then made it
necessary to determine whether or not the trial court erred in denying de27. 351 Mo. 41, 45, 171 S. W. (2d) 625, 626 (1943).
28. 224 Mo. App. 601, 31 S. W. (2d) 250 (1930).
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fendant's requested instruction in the nature of a demurrer to the plaintiff's
evidence, applying Oklahoma law. The court held that a motorist whose
truck was struck at a crossing by a train traveling 70 miles per hour and
who, under the evidence, apparently did not look to ascertain if a train was
approaching, was contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
While not developing the law in any particular, the case of Paisley v.
Kansas City Public Service Co.29 does throw light on how not to draft instructions on contributory negligence.

E. Burden of proof
An interesting burden of proof instruction in negligence cases is found in

Linquist v. Kansas City Public Service Co.30 There a trolley bus passenger
seeking to recover for injuries allegedly sustained in a collision submitted
charges of negligence in the conjunctive in her given instructions. The defendant charged "that under the law the burden of proof on the above issues
rests upon plaintiff, . . .and this burden of proof on the above issues continues and abides with her throughout the trial, and requires her to establish
the truth of each of such charges as laid to the reasonable satisfaction of the
jury by the greater weight of all the credible evidence in the case, . . ..
There was a verdict for the defendants afid- on motion a new trial was granted
by the trial court on the ground that error was committed in giving defendants' converse instructions on the burden of proof making no mention of
contributory negligence. On appeal the plaintiff argued, since it was necessary for a recovery to establish only one and not all of the charges of negligence thus submitted in the conjunctive, that the defendants' instructions
imposed an excessive and unlawful burden upon the plaintiff in requiring
the plaintiff to prove all of the charges of negligence submitted in her principal instruction. The court reversed the trial court's order for a new trial,
permitting defendant to hold the verdict of the jury, on the ground that the
one having the negative has the right to put the affirmative to the proof of
the facts establishing the case. The plaintiff cannot charge acts of negligence
in the conjunctive and then where the proof establishes some but not all of
the charges be permitted to predicate prejudical error upon defendant's
submission of the converse of that which plaintiff submits.
A burden of proof instruction which provides that the plaintiff must
prove '" 'to the satisfaction'" of the jury has received steady condemnation
29. 351 Mo. 468, 173 S. W. (2d) 33 (1943).
30. 350 Mo. 905, 908, 169 S. W. (2d) 366, 367 (1943).
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of the court, but lawyers and trial court still use it and the court still condemns although not reversing cases on that ground alone. 31 The court has
attempted to provide a standardized instruction on the burden of proof in
the negligence cases. But counsel continue to attempt slight shadings, presumably for advantage on the jury, only to run chances of not being permitted to hold the verdict in the supreme court because of their attempt
which probably did not have the slightest influence on the jury in the first
place.

2

Likewise the use of language in a burden of proof instruction upon the
issue of negligence if the jury finds "'.

.

. that the evidence is evenly divided

is technically erroneous, said the court, in Chamberlain v. MissouriArkansas Coacb Lies, 33 as it may have the tendency to inform the jury
that the preponderance of evidence is to be weighed by the number of wit.'"

nesses testifying on either side of an issue. "Preponderance of evidence," the
court explains "is the greater weight of the credible evidence, that is, evidence
tending to show the facts upon which a party's case or affirmative defense
depends, which is more convincing to the triers of the fact as worthy of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto." 34

31. Mueller v. Schien, 176 S. W. (2d) 449, 454 (Mo. 1943).
32. For a fuller treatment of the instruction on the burden of proof which
the court approves together with various shadings which it condemns, see (1943)
8 Mo. L. Rev. 303, and cases cited in the footnote.
33. 351 Mo. 203, 212, 173 S.W. (2d) 57, 62 (1943).
34. There were other decisions during the period under review in this
field but they presented nothing of importance to the subject involved. The retrial
of the case of Teel v. May Department Stores Co., 176 S. W. (2d) 440 (Mo. 1944),
an action in false imprisonment, brought forth no new issues not reported on the
first appeal. The case involved the privilege of an owner of a store or other
premises to detain a person therein, for a reasonable time for a reasonable investigatidn, whom he has reasonable grounds to believe has not paid for what he has
received or is attempting to take goods without payment. See discussion of the
decision on the first appeal (1943) 8 Mo. L. Rev. 336, and a criticism by Roberts,
Privileged Detention in Actions for False Imprisonment in Missouri (1942) 13
Mo. B. J. 63. In Shaltupsky v. Brown Shoe Co., 350 Mo. 831, 16S S. W. (2d)
1083 (1943), a petition failed to state a cause of action in which a retail shoe
dealer sought to charge a shoe company, a bank, and the bank's president with
conspiracy to injure the retailer's business. The facts relied on were that for many
years the bank and its president had been unfriendly to him; that they had
threatened him with a termination of his business relations with the shoe company; that thereafter they advised the shoe company to discontinue the sale of
shoes to the plaintiff; that acting upon this advice the shoe company refused to
sell shoes to the plaintiff; that about the same time the bank refused to continue
business with the plaintiff; and that the shoe company then sued the plaintiff on
an account. The petition failed to allege that the defendants were under contract
to do business with the dealer or that the defendants sought to interfere with the
dealer's right to do business with other manufacturers and other bankers, and also
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol9/iss4/1

58

et al.: Work of the Missouri Supreme Court
1944]

WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT FOR 1943

355

TRUSTS
W. L. NELSON, JR.'

I. EXPRESS TRUSTS
A. Creation
Stephenson v. Stephenson1 was an action to establish a trust in real
estate. The plaintiff, who formerly owned the property, conveyed it to her
mother-in-law by quit claim deed after the latter had advised her by letter
to do that so as to prevent creditors from taking the property, saying that
she would sell the property or buy it herself. The property was later conveyed to the defendants for a nominal consideration. On appeal the court
affirmed judgment for the plaintiff on the theory of an express trust. The
court said it is not necessary that the declaration of trust be contained in
the instrument which transfers the legal title, but that the trust may be
set out in several instruments executed at times other than that at which
title was transferred, provided they show the existence of the trust. The
court found that the deed and the letters from the mother-in-law, when construed together, created an express trust.
B. Investment of Trust Funds
In Kimp ton, v. Spelman,2 an action to recover on a surety bond for
breach of trust, the court set out the duty of a trustee in making investments.
It said that he is required to exercise "'such care and diligence as men of
ordinary prudence, intelligence, and discretion would employ, not with a
view to speculation, but rather with a view to the permanency of the investment, considerirfg both the probable income and the probable safety of
the capital invested.'"
Finding for the plaintiffs, the court held that the trustee by in effect
lending money to himself and by making other loans on inadequate security
had failed to faithfully administer the trust.

failed to show that the defendants could accomplish by force of numbers any
result which they could not accomplish as individuals, or that the defendants'
conduct violated the statutes prohibiting combinations in restraint of trade.
*Attorney, Columbia. A.B., University of Missouri, 1933, LL.B., 1936.
1. 351 Mo. 8, 171 S. W. (2d) 565 (1943).
2. 351 Mo. 674, 684, 173 S. NV. (2d) 886, 892 (1943).
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IMPLIED TRUSTS

A. Constructive Trusts
Triessler v. Helmbaclera was an action for an accounting on the theory
of a constructive trust. The administrator of the estate of a St. Louis physician contended that decedent's former wife, her mother, and her step-father
had fraudulently induced decedent to turn over to them a large sum of
money.
The petition alleged that those defendants, promising that they would
hold the money for the physician's use, but with the secret intention of keeping it themselves, took advantage of their relationship and of the fact that
decedent's mind was impaired, and by falsely representing that the money
would be seized by the government for income taxes and that other individuals were liable to get it, induced him to turn the money over.
The court affirmed the judgment of dismissal, stating that the plaintiff
failed to sustain the burden of proof on the degree of proof required to establish a constructive trust. It said that the evidence was in harmony with the
possibility that the decedent had made a gift without the inducement of any
fraudulent representations and that the plaintiff had failed to show by evidence so ...clear, cogent, and convincing, 'as to exclude every reasonable
doubt

...

'"

that those defendants had fraudulently secured the money.

B. Resdting Trusts
In Hiatt v.
wife brought action against he rformer husband
to partition real estate to which title had been taken in their names as
tenants by the entirety. In a cross action the husband contended that since
the wife had paid nothing on the purchase price of the property all of her
interest was forfeited to him when the divorce was granted.
The court said that when a party furnishes the purchase money for real
estate and title is taken in the name of another it is ordinarily presumed
that the latter intends to hold it in trust for the former, but where a husband
purchases real 6state with his own funds and title is taken in the name of
himself and his wife an estate by the entirety is created and a trust will not
result. It found there was no evidence in the case to rebut the presumption
that the husband purchased the property as an intended settlement upon
his wife. The court then held that the subsequent divorce did not cause the
wife to lose her interest in the property, which she then held as a tenant in
4 a
HiattA

3. 350 Mo. 807, 808, 820, 168 S. W. (2d) 1030, 1038 (1943).

4. 168 S.W. (2d) 1087, 1090 (Mo. 1943).
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common, because "'a resulting trust must arise, if at all, at the instant
the deed is taken. Unless the transaction is such that the moment title
passes the trust results from the transaction itself, then no trust results.
It cannot be created by subsequent occurrences.'
Sutorius v. Mayor5 was an action by the beneficiaries under the will of
one mayor against the grantees of the testator's wife to quiet title to nine
acres of real estate. The property was originally in the name of the husband
but later an estate by the entirety was created. By his will the husband
created a trust and particularly mentioned two of the nine tracts of real estate, evidently assuming that title to all of it was in his name alone. The
widow acquiesced in the provisions of the will until she discovered, some four
years after her husband's death, the fact that there was an estate by the
entirety. On learning that she conveyed the property to her children, the
defendants, reserving a life estate for herself.
The plaintiffs, charging that the estates by the entirety had been created
by the testator solely for the purpose of avoiding the lien of a possible judgment in a suit then pending, contended that an estate by the entirety was
not intended and that a trust resulted in favor of the husband.
The court referred to the Hiat 6 case and said that the deed to the deceased and his wife created prima facie an estate by the entirety, because
when title to real property is taken in the name of a husband and wife, even
where the husband furnishes the purchase money, there is a presumption
that the husband intends the conveyance as a provision for his wife. The
court held that such presumption was not overcome, the plaintiffs having
failed to sustain their burden of proof.7

WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION
THOMAS E. ATKINSON*

In Davidso; v. Todd' a father, by conveying land to his son and the
heirs of his body, created a life estate in his son with contingent remainder
5. 350 Mo. 1235, 170 S. W. (2d) 387. Motion for rehearing overruled, 350
Mo. 1235, 171 S. W. (2d) 69 (1943).
6. Supra, Note 4.
7. In re McKinney's Estate, 351 Mo. 718, 173 S. AV. (2d) 898 (1943), involved the valuation of trust property for state inheritance tax purposes. The court
held that the trustee's compensation provided for in the will should be deducted
in arriving at the valuation of the estate subject to the tax.
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri, A.B., University of North Dakota,
1925; LL.B., University of Michigan, 1917; J.S.D., Yale, 1926.
1. 350 Mo. 639, 167 S. W. (2d) 641 (1943).
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in the heirs of the son's body and a reversion in the father subject to the life
estate in the son and the contingent remainder in the son's issue. The father
then died intestate leaving the son as his sole heir. It was held that the
reversion in the father passed to the son by descent so that when the son
later died without issue, a fee simple passed to the son's heir, in this case his
wife. The Restatement of the Law of Property confirms the proposition that

future interests which do not cease with the owner's death pass in accordance with the rules of intestate succession applicable to present interests.2
PROBATE AND CONTEST

In re Ortk's Estate3 is an aftermath of an earlier decision 4 which held
that under the Missouri statute' the will of a German national residing in
Germany must be offered for probate within one year after grant of letters
in spite of a treaty between United States and Germany to the effect that
nationals of both countries had full power to dispose of their personality by
will. The earlier case was in prohibition and forbade the probate judge from
recognizing the German will or distributing the property according to the
will which had been probated in Missouri after expiration of the one year
period. The present case arose out of a subsequent application in the probate
court to have the property distributed according to the will without its
admission to probate in Missouri. It was held that the matter was res
judicata since it was, or could have been, raised in the earlier case.
Probably the issue presented in the second case was actually raised by
the pleadings in the prohibition action; at least the contention in the second
case could have been presented in the first.6 If the second case had been
disposed of on the merits the court would undoubtedly have held that the
probate court should not order the property distributed according to a will
not admitted to probate in this state.7 As a result of this decision the Mis2. Section 164. See also 3 SImEs, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) § 721 et seq. Cf.
Byrd v. Allen 351 Mo. 99, 171 S. W. (2d) 691 (1942) noted in (1944) 9 Mo. L.
REv. 107; Bullock v. Peoples Bank of Holcomb, 351 Mo. 587, 173 S. W. (2d) 753

(1943).

3. 169 S. W. (2d) 401 (Mo. 1943).
4. Wyers v. Arnold, 347 Mo. 413, 147 S. W. (2d 644, 134 A. L. R. 876
(1941) discussed in (1942) 7 Mo. L. REv. 392, 448.
5. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 532.
6. The opinion is somewhat confusing in that it fails to distinguish between
res judicata as to causes of action and as to defenses. See RESTATEMENT, JUDGEMENTs (1942) § 50 comment e, § 52 comment f, H9 63, 68; von Moschzisker,
STARE DEcIsls, RES JUDICATA AND OTHER SELECTED ESSAYS (1929) 30, 49, 59, 63.

7. League v. Churchill, 164 Ga. 36, 137 S. E. 632 (1927); Olney v. Angell,

5 R. I. 198 (1858). Cf. Cunningham v. Kinnerk, 230 Mo. App. 749, 74 S. W. (2d)
1107 (1934).
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souri'property will probably be distributed according to the intestate laws
of Germany. The German legatees might have applied for remission of the
proceeds to the domiciliary administration in Germany. The granting of such
order is a discretionary matter." What effect the fact that some of the heirs
at law were residents of this state while all the legatees were residents of
Germany would have upon the exercise of discretion is problematical. It
should be pointed out that the probate judge had admitted the will to probate
in spite of the limitation statute and that we were not then at war with
Germany. It would not seem to be an abuse of discretion to order the property remitted to the domiciliary administration. It is more than possible,
however, that even the German legatees would not desire to have the proceeds remitted to Germany.
An interesting interstitial point was raised in Edinger v. Kratzer9 which
was a suit to set aside a deed because of mental incapacity of the grantor.
His will, executed two years before execution of the deed, had been set aside
by verdict of the jury in a contest of the will. The record of the proceeding
was admitted in the deed case to show that the grantor died intestate. In
reversing the trial court's decree setting aside the deed the supreme court
declared that the verdict in the will contest could not be considered as any
evidence of the grantor's capacity to execute the deed, citing Wigginton v.
Busrns.'0 The cited case held that the verdict of incapacity in a will contest
was not controlling in a subsequent suit involving a deed. Two reasons are
given in that case, first, that the parties were not the same in the two proceedings, second, that the judge in submitting a jury case and in refusing
to set aside a verdict is not declaring that he would have decided the case
the same way that the jury did. While the first of these reasons is doubtless
sound and sufficient the second is extremely doubtful. Its application would
seem to prevent the operation of the principle of res judicata unless the cases
1
were either both in law, or both in equity. However, in the Edinger case
the grantor might have been competent at the time of execution of the deed
2
and incompetent two years earlier when the will was made.1 In addition, the
8. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) §§ 254, 260; Naylor's Adm'r. v. Moffatt, 29 Mo.
126 (1859); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 522.
9. 175 S. W. (2d) 807 (Mo. 1943).
10. 216 S. W. 756 (Mo. 1919).
11. See St. Louis v. United Railways, 263 Mo. 387, 174 S. W. 78 (1915)
(equity decree res judicata in subsequent legal action); von Moschzisker, op. cit.
supra note 6, at 77.
12. However it appears that the deceased's condition was, if anything, becoming progressively worse.
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tests of capacity to make a will and a deed are not the same, though, if anything, a higher degree of mentality is necessary to make a deed than to make
a will.13 Upon one ground or another the decision in a will contest is not
apt to control a subsequent suit to set aside a deed.
Still the question decided in the Edinger case was not that of res judicata, nor perhaps of admissibility of the verdict to show incapacity. There
is ground for the view that the verdict would be admissible in evidence as
coming under the official statement's exception to the hearsay rule. 14 The
assertion in the opinion that the result in the will contest was no evidence
of incapacity to execute the deed might be taken as a declaration regarding
admissibility. On the other hand it may be merely a declaration that the
evidence is insufficient to move the court to a finding of incapacity to execute
the deed.
In Clark v. Powell15 the court en banc agreed that confidential relations
between the testatrix and the beneficiary plus activity of the latter in procuring the will authorized submission of the issue of undue influence to the
jury. However, in submitting the issue, the trial court defined undue influence as an influence which coerces or confuses the mind so that the instrument does not represent the true desire of the testatrix. Without defending
the intimation that confusion of the mind may constitute undue influence
the majority opinion says that the instruction as a whole was not reversible
error. Two judges dissented on the ground that the instruction authorized
finding undue influence from mere confusion of the mind induced by the
beneficiary. It is interesting to speculate how far this sort of controversy
may arise under the new Civil Code's provisions relative to objections to instructions before they are given to the
jury.16
Dowling v. Luisetti7 indicates the judicial tendency to uphold wills even
though the jury has found that testator was mentally incompetent. The
testator was 80 years of age and left all his property to a friend, disinheriting
relatives in Ireland who contested the will. Testimony for proponent indi13. See Green, Judicial Tests of Mental Incompetency (1941) 6 Mo. L. REv.
141, 158.
14. Schindler v. Royal Insurance Co. 258 N. Y. 310, 179 N. E. 711, 80 A. L.
R. 1142, 1147 (1932); 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (1940) §§ 1671, 1671a; Green, Proof
of Mental Incompetency (1944) 53 YALE L. J. 271, 286.
15. 175 S. W. (2d) 842 (Mo. 1943).
16. See Mo. Laws (1943) § 105 (a), § 122. It is probable that before this
article is printed the supreme court will promulgate a rule indicating the connection
between these two Sections of the new code.
17. 351 Mo. 514, 173 S. W. (2d) 381 (1943).
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cated that testator was mentally competent until a week after he made his
will. No one who had seen testator testified for contestants as to the mental
condition of the testator. There was, however, expert testimony for contestants though it was in part based upon assumptions not established by
the evidence. 8 The court reversed the judgment below and ordered the
will admitted to probate.
CLAIMS AND

EXPENSES

OF

ADMINISTRATION

Hukred's Estate9

In re
raises interesting problems concerning promises
by a decedent to will all or a fractional part of his estate in return for services
to be rendered by the promisee. A claim was filed in probate court alleging
an oral promise of the decedent to leave claimant one-third of the estate in
return for services to be rendered until promissor's death. Performance by
the claimant is alleged for 87 months and also the total value of the estate.
The claim then states that the services were reasonably worth one-third of
the latter sum and prays that the claim be allowed in that amount. Later
the claim was amended, increasing the amount, due to the fact that the
inventory showed a larger value of the estate. Apparently no question concerning the Statute of Frauds was involved in the case. The jury in the
circuit court brought in a verdict for the sum prayed in the original claim
with interest added. The trial court ordered and claimant accepted a remittitur in the sum of $9,200.90 and gave judgment for $8,700. The executor
appealed upon the record proper without a bill of exceptions.
Appellant urged that claimant's sole remedies were either a suit in the
nature of specific performance against the heirs, or a claim in quantum ineruit
for the reasonable value of claimant's services. Recovery of damages for
breach of an express contract was urged to be precluded under the principle
announced by a court of appeals decision 20 which went on the ground that
there was no reasonable basis to estimate damages as the parties cannot
know what the net value of the estate will be and this cannot be ascertained
until all claims and expenses are allowed against the estate. Admitting the
technical difficulties involved, this objection is not insurmountable and courts
in other jurisdictions have allowed damages based on the net value of the
estate.2 '
18.
mony in
19.
20.
21.

For an appraisal of the effect given by appellate courts to expert testiwill contests, see Green, op. cit. supra 284, n. 14.
172 S. W. (2d) 824 (Mo. 1943).
Whitworth v. Monahan's Estate, 111 S. W. (2d) 931 (Mo. App. 1938).
Note (1924) 31 A. L. R. 129 133.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1944

65

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 4 [1944], Art. 1

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9

However, the supreme court did not pass on this point in the principal
case as there was no showing in the appellate court as to whether the case
was tried upon the express contract or the quantum neruit theory. The
claim is certainly amphibious enough to warrant recovery on either theory.
However, the jury's verdict, being based on the amount of the original
claim, seems to proceed on the express contract theory. On the other hand
the court's action in ordering a remittitur is palpably based on the theory
of quantum neruit for the judgment was in the even sum of $8700.00 and
the claimant performed services for 87 weeks. How can it be said that the
jury necessarily would have believed that the services were reasonably worth
the latter sum even though it gave a verdict for more than twice that amount
on the theory of express contract The appeal seems to have presented a situation demanding determination of the validity of the Court of Appeals
decision. At any rate such a determination would have been appropriate,
and would have been of assistance to the bar. While the substantial recovery
under these facts would be the same in a suit in the nature of specific per-,
formance as in an action for damages upon the express contract, the two
remedies involve different parties-and different methods of trial. It remains
to be seen whether a claimant can sue for damages for breach of the express
contract or whether he must elect between a specific performance suit and
a quantum meruit action-in which latter case the amount of recovery may be
substantially less.
2
2 illustrates the posState ex rel. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Sartorus
sible use of a revoked will as evidence of a contract to devise. Claimant employed the statutory discovery procedure in order to inspect the will. The
executor returned that it did not have possession of any document of testator
which referred to the claimant, and was cited for contempt for failure to
exhibit the revoked will and served with a subpoena duces tecum to produce
it. The executor retaliated by bringing prohibition against the circuit judge.
It was held that the revoked wilt might contain evidence of the contract to
devise; that it should be produced and the conclusion that it did not refer
to claimant was no excuse for not doing so; and that a subpoena duces tecum
could be employed as a remedy supplemental to the contempt proceeding.
The opinion in In re Estate of TJomasson23 states that sixteen proceedings involving this estate had already reached the supreme court, ten
of them reported. The present proceeding involved important legal proposi22.
23.

351 Mo. 111, 171 S. W. (2d) 569 (1943).
350 Mo. 1157, 171 S. W. (2d) 553 (1943).
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tions regarding fees of attorneys for the former personal representatives.
The movants acted as attorneys for the administratrices for a period of eight
months until a will was discovered and the administratrices were supplanted
by the executor acting as administrator pendente lite during determination
of a will contest. The administratrices immediately filed their final account
which claimed nothing for fees for their attorneys. This account was allowed
and no claim was made for attorney fees until after the will had been
finally sustained by the supreme court three years later. Movants' claim for
allowance of fees was resisted by the executor upon the ground that the
settlement by the administratrices was final and that their attorneys were
thereafter barred for claiming an allowance. In rejecting the executor's
contention the court points out the dual nature of liability for fees of attorneys for a personal representative, viz., as an obligation of the representative by the contract of employment, and as an obligation of the estate to the
extent that the services are necessary and beneficial to the estate. The settlement by the administratrices was deemed final only as to their own relations. It is not the final settlement of the estate and liability of the estate
for the attorney fees continues. It was further declared that movants were
justified in waiting until final determination of the will contest before presenting their claim because if the will had been disallowed the administratrices would have been reinstated and the movants would doubtless have
completed the legal work necessary for the settlement of the estate.
The court then proceeds to consider whether the services were beneficial to the estate. During the lifetime of the decedent, movants had been
employed by a number of decedent's relatives to protect his property against
the impositions of others. The services called for under this contract were
held not identical with those under the contract made with the administratrices wherein the movants represented the whole estate with regard to
these matters. It was also contended that the movants should not be compensated for preserving the decedent's real estate as that passes directly to
the heirs rather than to the personal representatives. However, in this case
the suits to quiet title prosecuted by movants also had as their purpose cancellation of decedent's notes which otherwise might have been asserted as
claims against his personal estate. Furthermore, though not placed by the
court upon this ground, it would seem that where the estate would be insolvent if the real estate were lost, legal services in protecting the real estate
are properly contracted for by the personal representative and should be
deemed to be rendered for the benefit of the estate.
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ELECTION

At least three cases 24 involved questions of election, waiver, or estoppel.
Sutorius v. Mayor2s was a suit to quiet title brought by testator's children by

his first wife against the children of his fourth wife. In 1933 testator transferred his real property through a straw man to himself and his fourth wife
as tenants by the entireties. He died. in 1935 with a will made earlier in
that year, leaving his automobile and household effects to his widow, the
homestead to her for life, and the residue, after certain special legacies, to
a trust which gave his widow most of the income for life and provided that
five years after her death the property should be distributed equally to all
of his children. The will purported to include within testator's estate the land
which had been transferred to testator and his wife by the entireties. The
widow was paid her statutory allowances and also received the income of
the trust estate. In 1939 she learned for the first time that the real property
had been held by the entireties though the deeds had been recorded before
the testator's death. She promptly sought an audit with the estate, deeded
the land to her children, and then died.
After disposing of the attack upon the creation of the estate by the
entireties the court devotes most of the opinion to the contention that the
widow had elected to take under the will. The court recognizes the general
proposition that a devisee who accepts benefits under a will is estopped to
claim the devisee's own property which the will purports to devise,20 but the
court holds that one who is ignorant of his own ownership at the time of
receiving benefits under the will-is not deemed to elect to take under the will,
nor does he waive the right to assert his ownership, nor is he in anywise
estopped to assert the right. The knowledge necessary to preclude the
devisee from asserting his ownership is actual knowledge and not the notice
given under the recording act-at least as against persons who did not change
their position prior to renunciation of the will. The statutory provision re27
quiring election of dower or statutory share of land devised within one year
was held not to apply to the situation where the testator did not own the
land devised, and this statute did not prevent the devisee from asserting title
in herself after the year.
-24. See also case cited infra at note 46.
25. 350 Mo. 1235, 170 S. W. (2d) 387, 171 S. W. (2d) 69 (1943).
26. See infra note 28.
27. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 333.
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Another unsuccessful attempt to invoke the principle that a person must
surrender his own property devised by another in order to accept benefits
under the will was made in Langsdale v. Dearing.21 Testator made a specific
bequest of certain bank stock in trust. He later made absolute gifts inter
vivos of the bank stock and other property to one of the two life tenants under the trust. Still later he revoked a cash bequest and otherwise ratified the
will. The donee of the bank stock qualified as an executor under the will.
The other life tenant claimed that the donee must surrender the stock and
other property as he had accepted benefits under the will. The court briefly
disposes of the contention that the other property not specifically devised
must be returned. As this property would have passed under the residuary
clause only, no election is required because the residuary clause passes only
property owned by testator at his death and does not purport to do more.
More difficulty is encountered in the case of the bank stock specifically
bequeathed. However, no election was required, first, because the legacy, had
been adeemed by the transfer inter vivos, and second, because at the time
of execution testator owned the stock and could have had no intention to
require the donee to elect with regard to it. Reference is made to the principle that, while the will speaks from the time of death, intention must be
determined as of the date of execution.29 The court refuses to consider the
will as of the date of the republication by the codicil since this doctrine would
defeat the intention of the testator. Finally it was held that the donee of the
stock had not "subverted the purpose of the will" so as to forfeit his right
thereunder in accordance with the forfeiture clause contained in the will.
In Seifner v. Weller 3" testator devised his property to his wife for life
and on her death to be equally divided among his nine children. He then
expressed his desire that his son, Leo, should receive the farm on which he
then resided at a valuation of $5,000, Leo to pay the other children any sums
necessary to make an equal division. Leo served as executor of his father's
estate and continued to live on the farm and improve it during the fourteen
years of his mother's widowhood. Sixteen months after the widow's death,
Leo attempted to renounce the devise as being burdensome to him and
claimed a ninth share of the estate plus an allowance for his improvements
to the farm.
28. 351 Mo. 356, 173 S. W. (2d) 25 (1943).
29. See text infra at notes 44, 45.
30. 171 S. W. (2d) 617 (Mo. 1943).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1944

69

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 4 [1944], Art. 1

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9

The opinion considers first the effect of the attempted renunciation. It
was held that Leo was not required to elect whether he would accept the
farm until the death of is mother. While a devisee should have renounced
an unburdened devise before sixteen months after the time at which he
becomes entitled to possession under the will, that time was not unreasonable when it was uncertain whether it would be advantageous to accept the
devise. Neither the acts of qualification as executor nor of obtaining quitclaim deeds from the other heirs freeing devisee from the burden were considered an acceptance of the devise.
The court then proceeds to construe the will which is deemed mandatory
as to equal division between the nine children but only precatory as to Leo
receiving the farm as his share. As Leo renounced the precatory provision
he was held entitled to a ninth share of the estate, including the farm in
question. Had the court considered first the construction of the will it might
have concluded that there was no special devise of the farm at all and that
the precatory language was not binding on Leo. No probable difference in
result would have likely resulted from this order of consideration.
LAPSE AND ABATEMENT

In Crawford v. Arenuds"l testatrix executed her will in 1933 leaving property to her cousin who died later in that year. Testatrix died in 1941. The
question presented was whether a child adopted by the cousin in 1916 under
the old adoption laws2 could take the interest devised to the cousin under
the anti-lapse statute33 as the "lineal descendant" of the cousin. It was held
that the adopted child's rights must be determined under the adoption statutes in force at the time of her adoption and that under the old statute the
adopted child's rights are limited to inheritance from his adoptive parent.
The court also held on rehearing that a statute 34 passed five days before the
original opinion was delivered to the effect that a child adopted under the
old law ".. . shall hereafter be deemed and held to be for every purpose the
child of its parent or parents by adoption as fully as though born to them
in lawful wedlock, . ." could have no application since the case was not
adjudicated in the trial court under that statute.

31.
32.
33.
34.

351 Mo. 1100, 176 S. W. (2d) 1 (1943).
Mo. REv. STAT. (1909) § 1671, 1673, 1675.
Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 528.
Mo. Laws (1943), 353.
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The 1943 law purports to apply in prospect the rules of inheritance applicable under the present adoption law 3 5 to cases of adoption under the old
law and the above quoted language is the same as that in the present adoption law. However, it is somewhat doubtful whether a person adopted by
the devisee under the present law would be regarded as a "lineal descendant"
of the devisee within the meaning of the anti-lapse statute, particularly in
view of the fact that the adoption law also provides that the adopted child
shall not be capable of inheriting from or taking through the adoptive parent
".*. property expressly limited to heirs of the body of such . . . parent by
adoption." Does this proviso refer to limitations imposed by statute as well
as by instrument? Are lineal descendants "heirs of the body"? In addition,
the anti-lapse statute in another regard has been construed so as to keep the
property in the blood lines of the testator.36 This question must still be regarded as an open one.37
In re Bernheimer's Estate38 raises questions as to what bequests must
bear the burden of expenses of administration and of federal and state
inheritance taxes, or in substance questions of abatement of legacies. The
will first made several pecuniary legacies payable out of stocks and bonds,
which legacies were directed to be paid free and clear of expenses and taxes.
It was then provided that all property owned at death except stock and
bonds was bequeathed to the son of testatrix. Finally the will gave all
stock and bonds, after payment of gifts payable therefrom, in trust to pay
the income to the son for life with power to encroach upon the principal to
the extent of $15,000 annually. There were certain provisions for the son's
possible issue and if the son left no issue the balance of the trust property
was given to charities. The property given to the son absolutely, consisting
of cash, fur and jewelry, was insufficient to pay the federal estate tax, let
alone the Missouri tax and the expenses of administration.
For the purpose of the questions presented, the federal estate tax fell
in the same category as expenses of administration since it was imposed
against the estate as a whole and not upon the individual beneficiaries. The
35. Mo. REV. STAT (1939) § 9614.
36. A devise to testator's spouse is not one to a "relative" within the meaning
of the act. Bramell v. Adams 146 Mo. 70, 47 S. W. 931 (1898); Knighten v.
Gideon, 344 Mo. 246, 125 S. W. (2d) 863 (1939).
37. It must be remembered that the present adoption statute with its sweeping language was passed subsequently to the anti-lapse statute and hence may be
taken as modifying it. See generally Limbaugh, The Adoption of Children in Missouri, 2 Mo. L. REv. 300, 311, (1937); Notes (1940) 5 Mo. L. REV. 98, 259.
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court points out that while the classification of legacies into specific, general
and residuary gifts is a useful one it is not determinative of the issues involved here. A testator may indicate that specific legacies abate before
general legacies and his intention must prevail in this regard if it can be
discovered. Here the absolute gift to the son would have been rendered
nugatory if it abated before the trust property in order to pay the federal
tax and the expenses of administration. Since testatrix obviously had the
latter items in mind she clearly did not intend to have the son's absolute
gift abate first. The absolute gift to the son is no more general nor more
specific in its terms than the trust gift. Hence it was concluded that the
absolute gift to the son and the trust property must bear these items rateably. It may be noted that these two legacies taken together constitute in
substance the residuary provisions of the will. Incidently it may also be
observed that while residuary legacies normally abate first, they are theoretically specific legacies within the definition commonly accepted.,, This illustrates further the impossibility of making the classification of legacies determinative of such questions as were involved here.
The Missouri inheritance tax is a tax upon the privilege of receiving
property through succession. There is no doubt but that the son's absolute
legacy must bear the Missouri tax upon that legacy and there was no controversy upon that point. The charities contended that the Missouri tax
on the son's interest in the trust property should be imposed on his life
interest, and not on the corpus. The court held that this should be taxed
upon the corpus, being influenced by the statutory provision that the tax
was payable by the executor "out of the property transferred."
CONSTRUCTION

Several of the foregoing cases'0 involve to some degree-the construction
of wills; four others involve nothing but construction. While construction
cases are usually of great importance to the parties, the decisions do little
to forward the jurisprudence of the state since so many of them are decided
upon the basis of the individual testator's intention. No will (or almost
no will) has a twin. Even in case of identical wills the circumstances surrounding the respective testator are bound to be different so that the inter1
38. 176 S. W. (2d) 15 (Mo. 1943).
39. Mechem, Specific Legacies of Unspecific Things (1939) 87 U.oF PA. L.
RiEv. 546, 550-551.
40. See cases noted s'upra at notes 28, 30, 38.
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pretation of one has little bearing upon the interpretation of the other.
While it is true that courts seldom, and attorneys practically never, fail
to cite cases involving similar wills it is probable that these precedents have
less effect on the decisions than is indicated on the face of the opinions.
Still the opinions are valuable to the bar in order that the pitfalls into which
the draftsman may have fallen in the preparation of the will may be avoided
in the future.
The most difficult will construction case of the year, involving the
appointment of a special judge in order to reach a decision, should serve as a
beacon warning to laymen-who are inclined to draft their own wills. The
testator in First Trust Co. v. Myers4" executed his will at the age of 70 years.
He was a thrifty bachelor and had accumulated an estate of approximately
$70,000 and had retired from business some years before. His closest connection was his brother who was two years younger but in poor health and
of about equal wealth and still engaged in business. In addition, testator
then had a half-nephew, the son of a predeceased half-sister; two halfnephews and two half-nieces, children of another predeceased half-sister; and
a half-nephew, the son of a predeceased half-brother. Testator had not
heard from the latter half-nephew for many years and at the time of execution of the will did not know whether or not he was living. Next to his
brother testator was closest to the first half-nephew but he was on good
terms with the other four half-nephews and half-nieces.
Testator apparently drew his own will. Somehow, though it may have
been from the will of another person, he followed closely the will of Chief
Justice White of the United States Supreme Court who died in 1921. That
will was published in the lay press as well as in legal periodicals and had
been acclaimed as a model of brevity and good sense. The will is as follows:
"'This is my last will. I give, bequeath and devise to my wife, Leitac M.
White, in complete and perfect. ownership, all my rights and property of
every kind and nature, whether real, personal or mixed, wherever situated,
appointing her executrix of my estate without" bond and giving her seisin
thereof.'"
Our testator pursued this form closely in adapting it to his own use.
Perhaps he thought that what was good enough for a Chief Justice of the
United States Supreme Court was good enough for him. Instead of the
words "'wife, Leita M. White'" he inserted the words "'legal heirs, who
41.

351 Mo. 899, 174 S. W. (2d )378 (1943).
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are as follows':" and then proceeded to name his brother and half-nephews
and half-nieces except the half-nephew of whom he had lost track. He also
stated their residences and their relationship to him, though there is no reference to the half blood. He omitted the above italicized words "or mixed,"
and made suitable changes to name the trust company and the favorite
half-nephew as executors and changed "her" to "them" in the last line. In
a separate paragraph he stated that he had not heard from the son of his
half-brother for many years and did not know whether he was living and
that if he should be living ten dollars was bequeathed to him.
This half-nephew was living at the execution of the will but died before testator, leaving three children. The controversy turned on the effect
of the gift "'to my legal heirs'" followed by an enumeration of some but
not all of the persons who would be entitled to the decedent's estate in
case of intestacy. Four members of the court including the special judge
concurred in the decision of the court for a per stirpes division among the
persons enumerated in the first paragraph. While there were some surrounding circumstances which might indicate that this was testator's probable
intention the majority opinions relied principally on the ground that the
statute of descents and distributions is a "safe guide" for construction in
absence of indications of a contrary intention. Another member of the
court agreed that there should be a per stirper division but dissented upon
the ground that the children of the absent half-nephew should be included
therein. Two members of the court dissented in the belief that the will
called for a per capita division among the enumerated persons. They regarded the expression-"my legal heirs" as descriptive and not as disposing
words. This opinion finds some indication of an intention for equality in
the words "in complete and perfect ownership."
In passing it may be noted that Chief Justice White was a native of
Louisiana and practiced law in that state prior to his elevation to the bench.
Familiar as he was with the civil law of that state the words "'in complete
and perfect ownership'" and "'giving them seisin thereof'" had a technical
significance for him.4 2 Whatever these expressions meant to the Missouri

testator who was a layman, it is clear that he did not intend to attach to
them their meaning under the Louisiana law.4
42. See LA. Civ. CODE (Dart 1932) ARTs. 490, 491, 1659, 1660.

43. See Mr. Justice Hyde's opinion at 351 Mo. 899, 921, 174 S. W. (2d) 378,
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In Gannett v. Shepley the testator directed that $1800 per year be paid
to his brother-in-law and in case he died "'leaving his wife him surviving'"
a like sum to her as long as she should live. Testator and the beneficiary
were married to sisters and the families were on good terms. The will was
made in 1914 and testator died the following year. The brother-in-law's
wife died in 1920, and he married plaintiff in 1921 and died in 1936 survived by plaintiff who claims the annuity. The case involved the question
as to whether the provision refers to the wife at the time of execution or of
testator's death, or to any wife who might survive the brother-in-law. The
parties cited rival rules of construction and also indications in this and other
provisions of the will in favor of their respective contentions. The court decided the case, however, upon the basis of the surrounding circumstances of
the relationship of the parties. It was held that testator intended to benefit
his wife's sister who was the wife of the male beneficiary at the time of
execution of the will and not any wife whom the latter might leave at his
decease. 45
In Thompson v. Thompso 4 6 testator left his farm to his wife for life
and at her death to his two sons on condition that they take the farm at
a valuation of $2400, which was to be divided equally among testator's four
children. The two sons administered the estate and both died about two
years later. The life tenant is still living. The widow of one of the sons
claims a child's share of her husband's interest in the farm and tenders
$600 as her husband's share of the sum of $2400 to be paid. The trial court
held that failure of the sons to jointly accept the devise and pay the $2400
caused the farm to pass as intestate property. This decision was reversed,
the court holding that the policy of construing an estate to be vested rather
than contingent applied so as to lead to the construction that it was vested
in the sons immediately upon the testator's death. The sons were regarded
47
as tenants in common in accordance With the statutory presumption and
joint acceptance was not required. The sum payable by the sons was held
to be a charge or lien upon the land, rather than a condition to the vesting
of the estate.
8
In Palmisciano v. Staltari testator's will left all his property to his
wife for life and after her death if any be left the property was devised to
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

351 Mo. 286, 172 S. W. (2d) 857 (1943).
See text supra at notes 28, 29.
175 S.W. (2d) 885 (Mo. 1943).
Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 3504.
175 S. W. (2d) 793 (Mo. 1943).
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his brothers. There was a residuary devise to the widow and she was named
executrix without bond. The widow brought suit for construction of the
will to enable her to make title to satisfy a prospective purchaser of decedent's real estate which she claimed was necessary to sell for her support.
The trial court sustained a demurrer to the petition. This was taken to
mean that the trial court held that the widow had no right to entrench
upon the corpus of the estate under any circumstances. Citing previous
Missouri cases, the supreme court indicated that the language "if any be
left

. . .'"

does not imply a power of absolute disposition but that it may

permit the use of the corpus for the personal support of the life tenant.
It was held that the petition stated fact sufficient to entitle the widow to
have the court below adjucate the question of the merits and the cause
was remanded. One may ask why the supreme court did not construe the
will upon this appeal. The petition apparently set up the surrounding circumstances, though perhaps this might have been done more fully by evidence. Cannot a will be construed on demurrer? 40 If so, the instant case

seems to present an opportunity for the appellate court to finally determine
the controversy.50
CONCLUSION

The writer closes this article with the same thought with which he
began a review of the 1942 cases in this field.5 1 The wills cases for 1943
continue to show protracted proceedings and piecemeal justice2 This is
bad business for litigants, for the courts, and in the long run for the legal
profession. Some of the delay and multiple litigation inheres in the nature
of proceedings for the settlement of estates. The willingness of interested
parties to fight over the decedent's bounty is doubtless another factor. Ignorance of counsel accounts for the situation in some degree, though often this
merges into causes due to uncertainties of the law. Inefficient civil and

probate procedure contributes to the result. Finally the appellate courts
could improve conditions even under the existing system."

Neither the

49. See Graves v. Graves, 349 Mo. 722, 163 S. W. (2d) 544 (1942); Crawford v. Arends, supra note 31. Cf. cases cited supra at notes 41, 44.
50. The new civil code provides: "Unless justice requires otherwise the court
shall dispose finally of the case on appeal . . . ." Mo. Laws 1943, p. 395, § 140
(c). This is more mandatory in tone than Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) §§ 1229, 1231
which simply permit the appellate court to finally dispose of the case.
51. See (1943) 8 Mo. L. REv. 312, 313.
52. The Thomasson case, supra note 23, is the crowning example in the 1943
grist of cases. See also cases cited supra at notes 3, 9, 19, 22, 31.
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courts nor the legislature nor both combined can bring about a panacea but
they can do some things to remedy a much criticized situation.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
JoHN S. MARSALEK*

A section of the Missouri Workmen's Compensation law,' in common
with similar legislation in other states,2 applies the law under prescribed
circumstances to independent contractors, sub-contractors and their employes and also to the employes of purported lessees and tenants, where the
relationship is created to avoid liability. In accordance with, its evident
purpose the section is expressly. limited in application to persons who sustain injury, fatal or non-fatal, on or about the employer's premises, while
engaged in an operation of the usual business which the employer there
carries on. The interpretation of the expression "premises of the employer"
as used in this section came before the supreme court in State ex rel Potashnick, et al v. Fulbright, et al., Judges of the Springfield Court of Appeals,8
a proceeding in certiorari to review an opinion of the court of appeals 4 on
the ground that the opinion conflicted with a prior controlling opinion of
the supreme court. The relator, Potashnick, was engaged in the erection
of a line of poles and wires. He employed one Watkins, as an independent
contractor, to haul the poles from cars on a railroad sidetrack to the places
where they were to be installed. One of Watkins' employees was accidently
injured while engaged in unloading a pole from a car. He was awarded compensation against Potashnick on the theory that the railroad sid'inig and yard
were Potashnick's premises, and that the work in progress was an operation
of his usual business. The supreme court held that the rulink of the court of
appeals to this effect conflicted with the opinion of the supreme court in
Rutherford v. Tobin Quarries,5 and Sargent v. Clements6 that the expression
"premises of the employer" as used in the section referred to, contemplated
53. See text above at notes 48-50; also consider cases cited at notes 9, 31.
Cf. case cited at note 17 where final disposition is made by the supreme court.
*Attorney, St. Louis, LL.B. Washington University, 1910.
1. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) 3698.
2. 71 C. J., WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AcTs § 212.
3. 350 Mo. 858, 169 S. W. (2d) 59 (1943).
4. Bullock v. Potashnick et al., 162 S.W. (2d) 607 (Mo. 1942).
5. 336 Mo 1171, 1172, 82 S. W. (2d) 918, 919 (1935).
6. 337 Mo. 1127, 88 S. W. (2d) 174 (1935).
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places under the employer's exclusive control. The railroad tracks and yard
where the injury occurred were subject to use by the railroad and persons
other than Potashnick who had business there. The court, in quashing the
opinion of the court of appeals, held that the place was not Potashnick's
premises, under the section in question, and that he was not liable to the
injured party for compensation.
The plaintiff in Hungate v. Hutdson, et al.,7 a resident of Illinois, was
injured in a collision in that state between an automobile operated by him
and a moving van of defendant Hudson, operated by the latter's employee
Kreysar. Hudson and Kreysar were Missouri residents. Plaintiff and his
employer were subject to and bound by the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act, and plaintiff received compensation thereunder for his injury.
He filed suit against Hudson and Kreysar in Missouri to recover damages
for his injury. Defendants pleaded the Illinois Act as a bar to the suit.
-For an injury covered by the Illinois Act, where the undisputed facts
show that the employer, his employee, and the third party causing the injury
are all under the act, the remedies provided thereby are exclusive, but the
employee retains his right to recover damages against a third party who is
not bound by the act. The act applies automatically to various hazardous
occupations, including carriage by land and water.8 Whether defendants
were bound by the act was the principal question presented. On this subject the evidence showed that Hudson's place of business was located in
Missouri, but that he operated trucks into Illinois and other states. He
held a Workmen's Compensation policy covering injuries to employes occurring anywhere in the United States, but had never filed an acceptance of
the act with the Industrial Commission, nor had he filed his policy or
financial reports, as the law required. Hudson hired his employes in Missouri. The work which was performed by them in Illinois was of a temporary,
transitory character. As between him and his employes, it was conclusively
shown that the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act was applicable. The
court held, upon the foregoing facts, that there could be no question but
that plaintiff could maintain his action against defendant Kreysar. The
court said that Hudson had failed to show that he had elected to comply
with the act or that he was compulsority subject to it, and therefore he was
not entitled to rely upon its provisions beneficial to him as a defense.
7. 169 S. W. (2d) 682 (Mo. 1943).
8. ILL. STAT. (Smith-Hurd), c. 48, § 143, 166.
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Brown v. R. J. Brown Co., et al.9 presents the case of a traveling salesman, in the employ of two merchandising concerns, who was killed when
an automobile operated by him, in territory where he could have been serving either or both of the employers, collided with a tree. His widow filed
a claim for compensation against both employers. There were no witnesses
to the accident, and no direct evidence was introduced to show the purpose
of the fatal trip. There was evidence from which an inference could be
drawn that during the day, and within a short time prior to the accident, he
was performing services for the appellant, pursuant to the directions of its
president, and that he was on his return trip, following this work, when
the accident occurred. The commission found against the appellant and in
favor of the other employer. No appeal was taken by the claimant. The
award was affirmed, the court holding that the commission was well warranted in finding that the deceased was acting in the course of his employment for appellant at the time of his death. This, it appears from the opinion,
was the sole question before the court, even though the evidence showed that
the services rendered by the deceased were in the interst of the other company also.

McKay v. Delico Meat Products Company'0 was a suit for damages
for personal injuries, defended on the ground that the court was without
jurisdiction because the right of recovery was governed by the Workmen's
Compensation Act. The plaintiff, a bricklayer by occupation, entered into
an arrangement with defendant, a manufacturer of meat products, under
which plaintiff supervised the remodeling and repairing of defendant's plant.
The work was performed at intervals over a period of fifteen months. Plaintiff claimed that he was injured by gas, fumes and smoke which escaped
from defendant's smoke ovens, and ammonia which leaked from the pipes
and valves of its ice machines; that the condition was "awful bad" for a
period of about twelve days. He testified that as a result of working in the
conditions described his eyes, throat and lungs were injured.
Plaintiff received for his work $12.00 per day and 2% of the labor and
material bills, which were paid by defendant, together with the insurance
premiums and social security taxes. Plaintiff selected the men who worked
under him. According to his own admissions during the trial, he worked
under the orders, direction and control of the defendant's managing officials,
9. 351 Mo. 557, 172 S. W. (2d) 645 (1943).
10. 351 Mo. 876, 174 S. W. (2d) 149 (1942).
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and defendant had the right to dispense with his services at any time. In
view of these admissions, the court overruled plaintiff's contention that he
was an independent contractor, and that the compensation law did not
apply for that reason. Plaintiff raised the following additional points:
That even if he was an employee, the act did not apply because his injuries were not the result of an accident. The opinion rules that according to
plaintiff's own evidence, his injury resulted from an abnormal, unforeseen
and unexpected event, arising more or less suddenly, and producing objective
symptoms. This evidence satisfied the statutory definition of the word
"accident.""1
Plaintiff cited a provision of the act excluding employments which are
but casual, or not incidental to the usual business of the employer,1 2 and
called attention to the fact that the remodeling of the plant was not defendant's usual business, and that it was not a recurring situation. Answering
this contention, the court quoted a section of the act providing that one
employed for more than five and one-half consecutive work days shall be
considered a regular and not a casual employee.13
The argument that the work was not incidental to the defendant's
usual business was held untenable, because the plaintiff, during the progress
of the work, was engaged not only in remodeling, but also in repair and
patch work. The latter class of work, the court said, was clearly, and as a
matter of law incidental to defendant's usual operations. The court, in conclusion, reversed a judgment which had been rendered below in plaintiff's
favor, stating that plaintiff had failed to make a submissible case, and that
the trial court should have directed a verdict for defendant.
Effective October 10, 1941, the legislature amended the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act by extending the time allowed for the filing of
claims from six months to one year."' Whether the extension applied to
accidents which took place before the effective date of the amendment was
the question before the supreme court in Wentz v. Price Candy Company et
al." The employee was injured on April 26, 1941. She delayed filing her
claim until December 26, 1941, which was eight months after the accident.
Under the original statute, the claim would have been barred on October
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 3695 (b).
Id. at § 3693.
Id. at § 3695 (d).
Id. at § 3727; Mo. Laws (1941) 718.
175 S. W. (2d) 852, 855 (1943).
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26th, but in the meantime the amendment came into operation. To answer
the question presented, the court in its opinion held that it was necessary to
determine whether the time limitation contained in the act operated merely
on the remedy, or was such an integral part of the right that its lapse extinguished the right altogether. The court traced to its origin the distinction
between the class of statutes creating a right of action conditional upon its
enforcement within a prescribed period, and ordinary statutes of limitation
which affect the remedy only, calling attention to the fact that in the early
development of the subject, the only statutes included in the first mentioned class were those which definitely declared the right to be a nullity
after the period had expired. The intent of the legislature, as evidenced by
the language employed, was thus held to be the guide in determining to
which class a particular enactment should be assigned. The limitation section
of the Compensatiop Act, both in its original and amended forms, nowhere
provides that the right to compensation shall be deemed to be extinguished,
or a nullity, if no claim is filed within the period specified, but on the contrary by its language "'no proceedings for compensation ... shall be maintained . . . .'" refers only to the remedy. Furthermore, the statute expressly
states that it is one of limitation, in its provision: "'In all other respects such
limitations shall be governed by the law of civil actions . . . .'" The court
found that the legislature clearly intended the statute in question to be one
of limitation and repose, affecting the remedy only, and overruled prior
opinions in which the courts of this state had reached a contrary conclusion.
The court rejected arguments based upon a provision of the Code of Civil
Procedure,"' barring the retrospective application of the limitation sections
contained therein, and held further that since the statute enlarging the limitation period of the Compensation Act was procedural, no vested right was
violated by its application to claims already accrued. A judgment of the
circuit court, holding the Wentz claim to be barred, was reversed, and the
case remanded for further proceedings.

16. Mo. REv.

STAT.

(1939) § 1039.
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